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The Economic and Budgetary Effects of 
Producing Oil and Natural Gas From Shale
Summary
Recent advances in combining two drilling techniques, 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, have allowed 
access to large deposits of shale resources—that is, crude 
oil and natural gas trapped in shale and certain other 
dense rock formations.1 As a result, the cost of that “tight 
oil” and “shale gas” has become competitive with the 
cost of oil and gas extracted from other sources. Virtually 
nonexistent a decade ago, the development of shale 
resources has boomed in the United States, producing 
about 3.5 million barrels of tight oil per day and about 
9.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf ) of shale gas per year. Those 
amounts equal about 30 percent of U.S. production of 
liquid fuels (which include crude oil, biofuels, and 
natural gas liquids) and 40 percent of U.S. production 
of natural gas. Shale development has also affected the 
federal budget, chiefly by increasing tax revenues.
The production of tight oil and shale gas will continue to 
grow over the next 10 years—by about 30 percent and 
about 60 percent, respectively, according to a recent pro-
jection by the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA).2 Another EIA estimate shows that the amount of 
tight oil and shale gas in the United States that could be 
extracted with today’s technology would satisfy domestic 
oil consumption at current rates for approximately 
8 years and domestic gas consumption for 25.3
How Will Shale Development Affect Energy Markets?
Total domestic production of oil and natural gas will 
continue to be higher than it would have been without 
shale development, reducing the prices of those energy 
supplies. The lower prices, in turn, will increase domestic 
consumption of oil and gas, domestic consumption of 
energy overall, and net exports of gas, while decreasing 
the production of oil and gas from conventional 
resources, net imports of oil, and the use of competing 
fuels.
Shale gas has affected energy prices in the United States 
more strongly than tight oil has, and it will continue to 
do so. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimates that if shale gas did not exist, the price of natu-
ral gas would be about 70 percent higher than currently 
projected by 2040—whereas if tight oil did not exist, the 
price of oil would be only about 5 percent higher. One 
reason for the difference is that shale gas is more plentiful 
than tight oil, relative to the size of their domestic mar-
kets. Another is that the North American market for nat-
ural gas is relatively insulated from conditions elsewhere 
by high transportation costs, so the effects of higher or 
lower domestic production on market prices are concen-
trated within the continent; oil, by contrast, is heavily 
traded in a worldwide market that diffuses the effects of 
domestic production on prices. (Oil prices are thus influ-
enced by events that occur elsewhere in the world. For 
example, the recent sharp drop in crude oil prices—as 
of the end of November 2014, they had dropped about 
1. For convenience, the term “shale resources” in this report includes 
energy supplies contained by formations of low-permeability rock 
that is not shale, such as limestone and fine-grained sandstone.
2. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
3. Those estimates are based on Energy Information Administration, 
Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assess-
ment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United 
States (June 2013), www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/; 
and on Louis Sahagun, “U.S. Officials Cut Estimate of Recover-
able Monterey Shale Oil by 96%,” Los Angeles Times (May 20, 
2014), http://tinyurl.com/pnknuct.
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one-third from their recent peak in June—was caused not 
by any sudden or dramatic increase in the supply of tight 
oil during that period but by other factors, such as a rapid 
increase in Libyan production and a slowdown of con-
sumption in Europe and Asia.)
EIA’s projections of the development of shale resources 
are the most detailed currently available, and CBO con-
siders them an appropriate basis for estimating the poten-
tial economic and budgetary effects of shale develop-
ment. Nonetheless, like all projections of the future, they 
are subject to significant uncertainty. Many factors con-
tribute to the uncertainty; for example, the abundance of 
shale resources, the fraction of those resources that will be 
recoverable with evolving technology, and the costs of 
recovering that fraction are not known for certain. Projec-
tions of more or less shale development would lead to 
larger or smaller estimates of the economic and budgetary 
effects.
How Will Shale Development Affect 
Economic Output?
The technological innovations behind hydraulic fractur-
ing and horizontal drilling make existing labor and capi-
tal—whether they are employed in shale development, in 
industries using natural gas or oil, or in industries using 
products derived from natural gas or oil—more produc-
tive than they otherwise would be. That heightened pro-
ductivity has increased gross domestic product (GDP) 
and will continue to do so.
Shale development also boosts GDP in other ways. The 
increase in GDP just described represents increased 
income, which allows people and firms to save and invest 
more in productive capital, and the higher productivity 
just described increases wages, raising the amount of 
labor available. Both the increased capital and the 
increased labor raise GDP. In addition, in the near term, 
shale development causes labor and capital to be used 
that would otherwise be idle, again raising GDP. In the 
longer term, however, whether shale resources are avail-
able or not, the labor and capital available in the econ-
omy will be used at roughly their maximum sustainable 
rates, so the additional labor and capital used to produce 
shale resources or energy-intensive goods will mostly be 
drawn away from the production of other goods and ser-
vices. As a result, there will be no net change in GDP 
through that last route, although GDP will continue to 
be increased by shale development in the other ways just 
described.
On net, CBO estimates that real (inflation-adjusted) 
GDP will be about two-thirds of 1 percent higher in 
2020 and about 1 percent higher in 2040 than it would 
have been without the development of shale resources. 
The actual effect on GDP could be higher or lower than 
that estimate, depending on the uncertain factors noted 
above—the abundance of shale resources, the fraction 
of those resources that will be recoverable, and the 
cost of developing that fraction—as well as on other 
considerations.
How Will Shale Development Affect the 
Federal Budget?
The increase in GDP resulting from shale development 
has increased federal tax revenues, and it will continue to 
do so. That increase will be slightly larger than the GDP 
increase in percentage terms, CBO expects. Specifically, 
CBO estimates that federal tax revenues will be about 
three-quarters of 1 percent (or about $35 billion) higher 
in 2020 and about 1 percent higher in 2040 than they 
would have been without shale development.
Shale production also contributes to federal receipts 
through payments that the developers of federally owned 
resources make to the government—but that contribu-
tion has been modest and will continue to be, because 
most shale resources are not on federal land. Working 
from EIA’s projections of the future production of tight 
oil and shale gas, and also from its own forecasts of oil 
and natural gas prices, CBO estimates that federal royal-
ties from shale (minus the amounts that the federal 
government transfers to the states) will be about 
$300 million annually by 2020.
What Policy Options Would Affect 
Shale Development?
There are a number of ways that the Congress could 
affect shale development and thus affect the oil and gas 
markets, economic output, and the federal budget. This 
report considers options that would change export 
policies—easing the current ban on exports of crude oil, 
repealing it, or changing the government’s criteria for 
judging applications to export liquefied natural gas 
(LNG)—and concludes that the options would probably 
increase domestic production but have little effect on 
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Figure 1.
Hydraulic Fracturing and Horizontal Drilling
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
prices. That increase in production would probably make 
GDP and federal revenues slightly higher than they 
would be under current export policies.
Policy choices related to environmental regulation, such 
as whether the federal government should regulate fur-
ther the environmental effects of shale development 
or leave such decisions to the states, are outlined in 
Appendix A. The Congress could also affect shale devel-
opment through policies not considered here, such as 
those related to the infrastructure used to transport and 
process domestic shale gas and tight oil.
Hydraulic Fracturing and 
Shale Resources
Hydraulic fracturing, used with horizontal drilling and 
other advances in drilling technology, is a way to reach 
and extract natural gas and oil locked in certain rock for-
mations, especially shale formations.4 Some forms of 
hydraulic fracturing have been used to extract fossil fuels 
since the 1950s, but the method was not successfully 
combined with horizontal drilling for another 30 to 40 
years, and it began to have a substantial impact on natural 
gas and oil production only in the past decade.
The process (often called fracing or fracking) begins with 
drilling a vertical well to the depth of a shale formation 
and, from there, drilling a horizontal well into the forma-
tion, which is much wider than it is thick (see Figure 1). 
A high-pressure mixture of water, chemicals, and small 
particles is pumped into the well to create fractures in the 
formation. Those fractures are held open by the particles 
as the injected fluid is withdrawn. Oil and gas then flow 
from the fractures into the well and up to the surface.
According to EIA estimates, of the shale gas in the United 
States that is technically recoverable—that is, that could 
be developed with current technology—25 percent is in 
the Marcellus Shale formation, which is located mainly 
in New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia (see 
Figure 2). The formations with the next-largest quantities 
of shale gas are the Haynesville-Bossier Shale in Texas and 
Louisiana, containing an estimated 15 percent of techni-
cally recoverable resources; the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas, 
containing about 10 percent of those resources; and the 
Barnett Shale, also in Texas, and also containing about 10 
percent of those resources.
The Eagle Ford and Austin Chalk Shales in Texas, which 
are found at different depths but underlie some of the 
same land, together account for about 40 percent of 
Water Table
Various Rock Strata
Shale
Injected
Fluid
Oil and
Gas
4. This report focuses on shale development recently enabled by the 
use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. It does not 
consider the use of those techniques to produce “tight gas” (that is, 
natural gas extracted from less dense geologic formations), because 
such development has occurred for many years, or to enhance pro-
duction from conventional oil and gas supplies. Nor does it con-
sider kerogen shale (also known as oil shale), another kind of rock 
from which oil can be produced, because the oil is not extracted 
with hydraulic fracturing and its generally high cost is expected to 
keep production low for the foreseeable future.
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Figure 2.
Shale Formations in the United States
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Energy Information Administration, “Detailed Oil and Gas Field Maps” 
(accessed October 2, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/VKt4.
technically recoverable tight oil. An additional 20 percent 
is in the Bakken Shale in North Dakota and Montana.5
Effects on Energy Markets
The production of shale gas and tight oil has risen dra-
matically over the past decade. The shale gas increase has 
been so large that, if it came from a separate country, that 
country would now be the world’s third-largest natural 
gas supplier (behind first-place Russia and the U.S. sup-
plies not from shale). Because of shale gas, domestic 
production of all natural gas is on pace to increase for 
the ninth straight year and has reached record highs 
(see Figure 3). With that increase in production, the 
wholesale price of natural gas in North America fell by 
about 70 percent, in inflation-adjusted terms, between 
2008 and 2012, reaching its lowest level since 1998 
Marcellus
Bakken
Barnett
Haynesville-Bossier
Eagle Ford
Austin Chalk
5. The percentages in these two paragraphs are based on the most 
recently available data that distinguish shale gas from tight gas: 
Energy Information Administration, U.S. Crude Oil and Natural 
Gas Proved Reserves, 2012 (April 2014), Tables 2 and 4, 
www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves; Energy Information 
Administration, Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2013 
(May 2013), Table 9.3, http://go.usa.gov/vvne; and 
Louis Sahagun, “U.S. Officials Cut Estimate of Recoverable 
Monterey Shale Oil by 96%,” Los Angeles Times (May 20, 2014), 
http://tinyurl.com/pnknuct. More recent data do not distinguish 
shale gas from tight gas, but they do show a notable development: 
that the Spraberry/Wolfcamp Shale in Texas has become an 
important source of technically recoverable tight oil. See Energy 
Information Administration, Assumptions to the Annual Energy 
Outlook 2014 (June 2014), Table 9.3, http://go.usa.gov/sagw.
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Figure 3.
Annual Production of Natural Gas in the 
United States
Source: Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Dry Natural 
Gas Production” (accessed November 14, 2014),
http://go.usa.gov/7XgQ.
Note: Production in 2014 is an estimate based on monthly totals 
from January through September.
(see Figure 4).6 Though gas prices rebounded somewhat 
in 2013 and 2014, they remain low compared with the 
recent historical record.
The production of crude oil in the United States has also 
boomed, with domestic output up for the fifth straight 
year because of tight oil. But the increase in tight oil pro-
duction, unlike the corresponding increase in shale gas, 
has had only a modest impact on prices.7 As this report 
discusses below, the increase in tight oil is small relative to 
domestic oil consumption, and oil prices, unlike gas 
prices, are determined in a global market.
Shale development has affected other energy markets as 
well; for example, it has reduced the demand for coal. As 
the production of shale gas and tight oil increases, its 
effects on other energy markets—such as those for coal, 
for nuclear and renewable energy, and for energy-
conserving equipment—will also increase. In addition, 
some analysts predict that energy-intensive production 
activities will increasingly relocate to the United States to 
take advantage of low gas prices.
Trends in the Markets for Shale Gas and Tight Oil
According to EIA’s projections, supply and demand con-
ditions will keep the production of shale gas and tight oil 
growing in coming years—in fact, growing enough so 
that the overall domestic production of oil and gas will 
continue to grow, reversing the trend of the past several 
decades. Because of the growth in production, the 
domestic price of gas will be lower than it would have 
been in the absence of shale resources; so will the price of 
oil, though to a lesser extent. Those lower prices will 
boost oil and gas consumption and net exports of refined 
products and natural gas. (The quantity of exports will 
depend partly on federal policy choices, as the next 
section discusses.)
Production. EIA expects the production of shale gas to 
rise from 9.5 Tcf in 2013 to 20 Tcf in 2040. That 
increased production will be responsible for almost all 
the growth in overall U.S. gas supplies, which are pro-
jected to rise 13 Tcf over that time, from 24 Tcf in 2013 
to 37 Tcf in 2040.
Also, EIA projects that the production of oil from shale 
formations will be 1.4 million barrels per day higher in 
2020 than in 2013 but only 0.2 million barrels per day 
higher in 2040 than in 2013. That projection includes 
both tight oil and natural gas plant liquids, such as eth-
ane, propane, and butane, which are sometimes obtained 
6. Energy Information Administration, “Natural Gas Prices” 
(accessed November 4, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/Kfch. Retail 
prices paid by final buyers of natural gas have declined less sharply, 
because part of the retail price of natural gas covers the cost of gas 
transportation and taxes—costs that do not change as the whole-
sale price of gas declines. In addition, partly because of differences 
in the percentage of retail prices that cover the cost of transporta-
tion and taxes, not all buyers have seen the same declines in retail 
prices: The declines have been greatest (roughly 60 percent since 
2008) for large buyers, such as industrial users and electricity pro-
ducers, and smallest (about 25 percent) for residential customers.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
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7. Crude oil prices have declined by about a third in recent months, 
but not because of any sudden or dramatic increase in the avail-
ability of shale resources. Other factors, such as a rapid increase in 
Libyan production and a slowdown of consumption in Europe 
and Asia, have had a greater influence. A sustained reduction in 
crude oil prices would reduce U.S. production of both conven-
tional oil and tight oil in the near term, but the degree to which 
the recent weakness in oil prices will persist is unclear. All else 
being equal, lower trajectories for the price of oil or the produc-
tion of tight oil through 2020 or 2040 would reduce CBO’s 
estimates of the economic and budgetary effects of tight oil in 
those years.
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in the production of shale gas and are good substitutes for 
certain petroleum products. EIA expects that the produc-
tion of tight oil alone will grow from 3.5 million barrels 
per day in 2013 to a peak of 4.8 million by about 2020; it 
will then fall back to 3.2 million by 2040, as production 
from existing wells wanes and new wells in less promising 
areas yield less oil. Natural gas plant liquids are projected 
to increase modestly but more steadily, from 2.5 million 
barrels per day in 2013 to 3 million in 2040.
Prices. The availability of shale energy (that is, shale gas 
and tight oil that come to the market) should lessen the 
growth of energy prices in the years ahead. Shale gas will 
probably have a larger impact in that way than tight oil 
will. One reason is simply that shale gas is more plentiful, 
relative to domestic consumption. Shale gas production 
today equals about 35 percent of total U.S. gas consump-
tion, whereas tight oil production equals only about 
15 percent of U.S. consumption of liquid fuels. By 2040, 
according to EIA’s most recent long-term projection, 
shale gas will account for about 60 percent of all natural 
gas consumed in the United States, but tight oil will 
still represent only about 15 percent of all liquid fuels 
consumed.8
Another reason that U.S. natural gas markets will be 
more affected than domestic oil markets by shale energy 
is that they have far less international exposure. Natural 
gas markets are broadly split into three regions—North 
America, Europe, and Asia—and gas is transported 
within each of those regions by pipeline at relatively low 
cost. But the cost of transporting gas between regions is 
significant, primarily because it must undergo costly 
liquefaction before being shipped on oceangoing vessels. 
Therefore, little trade occurs between regions, and prices 
in the three markets are largely independent of one 
another. Crude oil, by contrast, can be moved around the 
world at relatively low cost by tanker ship or pipeline, 
which means that oil prices are approximately the same 
around the world. The effects of domestic shale gas pro-
duction will therefore be concentrated in North America, 
whereas the effects of domestic tight oil production will 
be diffused internationally.9
Though shale energy is expected to lessen the growth of 
energy prices, continued growth in demand means that 
those prices will nevertheless continue to rise. EIA cur-
rently projects a doubling of the real price of natural gas 
in North America by 2040, as well as a roughly 30 per-
cent increase in the real price of oil worldwide. Prices 
would be still higher if the production of U.S. shale 
energy turned out to be lower than EIA expects. For 
example, according to a recent EIA analysis, if shale 
resources turned out to be only half as abundant as the 
agency projected in its baseline scenario, domestic prices 
in 2040 would be about 40 percent higher for gas and 
somewhat less than 3 percent higher for oil than they 
would be under the baseline scenario.10 (Similarly, CBO 
estimates that if shale resources did not exist at all, the 
price effects would be roughly twice as large, with gas and 
oil prices in 2040 that were roughly 70 percent and 5 per-
cent higher, respectively, than currently projected.)
Consumption and Net Exports. Because of the lower 
prices that will result from shale development, the domes-
tic consumption of gas will be higher than it would have 
been in the absence of shale resources; net exports of 
natural gas (that is, international consumption of domes-
tically produced gas) will also be higher. Of the expected 
13 Tcf increase in natural gas production between 2013 
and 2040, EIA projects that 53 percent (about 7 Tcf ) will 
be reflected in greater net exports and 47 percent (about 
6 Tcf ) in increased domestic consumption (see Figure 5). 
Roughly 75 percent of that projected increase in domestic 
consumption will be in the electric power and industrial 
sectors.
The electric power sector’s increased consumption of gas 
will result not only from that sector’s higher overall pro-
duction of electricity but also from the growing impor-
tance of gas relative to other fuels. The EIA projection 
shows that by 2040, natural gas’s share of the total fuel 
used in the electric power sector will grow from 21 per-
cent to 25 percent; renewable fuels’ share will also grow,
8. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
9. For a broader discussion of geographic price differences in world 
energy markets, see Congressional Budget Office, Energy Security 
in the United States (May 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/
43012.
10. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB). The “low-resource” sce-
nario includes reductions in tight gas resources as well as in tight 
oil and shale gas resources. Economically viable shale gas is much 
more plentiful than tight gas, however, and accounts for about 
four-fifths of the total 2040 difference in gas production between 
that scenario and EIA’s baseline scenario.
DECEMBER 2014 THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF PRODUCING OIL AND NATURAL GAS FROM SHALE 7
CBO
Figure 4.
Average Annual Price of Natural Gas
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 
Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Natural 
Gas Wellhead Price” (accessed November 4, 2014),
http://go.usa.gov/7X2G, and “Henry Hub Natural 
Gas Spot Price” (accessed November 4, 2014),
http://go.usa.gov/7X2z.
Note: Prices shown from 1970 through 2012 are average wellhead 
prices for gas produced nationally. Because the 2013 and 
2014 averages are not available yet, averages for those years 
are derived from a historical relationship between average 
wellhead prices and the prices recorded at the Henry Hub 
natural gas pipeline interconnection in Louisiana. The Henry 
Hub price is commonly used as a benchmark for wholesale 
gas prices throughout North America. CBO converted prices 
into 2012 dollars by means of the GDP (gross domestic 
product) deflator.
while those of coal and nuclear power will shrink. In the 
industrial sector, by contrast, the increased use of natural 
gas is expected to be roughly in line with that sector’s 
growth.
Unlike the consumption of natural gas, the consumption 
of liquid fuel will be slightly lower in 2040 than in 2013, 
decreasing by about 1 percent, EIA estimates. The main 
reason is that changes in driving habits and improve-
ments in vehicles’ fuel economy are expected to reduce 
U.S. demand for liquid fuels. Also, the use of natural gas 
in the transportation sector is expected to grow, further 
lowering demand for petroleum.
The United States is currently a net importer of natural 
gas and of liquid fuels; that is, it consumes more than it 
produces (see Figure 6). But the production of shale 
resources has significantly reduced net imports—from 
nearly 4 Tcf of natural gas in 2007 to about 1.5 Tcf in 
2013, and from 12.5 million barrels per day of liquid 
fuels in 2005 to 6.2 million in 2013. EIA projects that 
the United States will become a net exporter of natural 
gas in 2017 and remain so through 2040.11 However, EIA 
expects the country to remain a net importer of liquid 
fuels throughout the projection period; net imports are 
projected to decline to about 5 million barrels per day as 
tight oil production increases, to stay steady for a few 
years, and then to return to current levels by 2040, as 
tight oil production falls.
Policy Options Related to Exports and 
Their Effects on Domestic Prices
To the extent that federal policy allows oil and gas to be 
imported and exported, their domestic prices reflect sup-
ply and demand not only in the United States but in 
other countries as well. Analysts and policymakers are 
currently proposing various changes to policies governing 
exports of crude oil and liquefied natural gas. In CBO’s 
view, such changes would probably increase domestic oil 
and gas production, but they would probably have only a 
small effect on the domestic price of gas and a negligible 
effect on the domestic price of oil (which, again, is largely 
determined in the world market).
As this report discusses below, increases in oil and gas 
production resulting from shale development have 
boosted U.S. economic output and federal receipts and 
will continue to do so. The further increases in produc-
tion that would result from the changes in export policies 
considered here would also have positive economic and 
budgetary effects, but smaller ones.
Exports of Crude Oil. Federal law prohibits the export of 
domestically produced crude oil, with few exceptions.12 
In 2013, only about 1 percent of crude oil produced in 
the United States (about 120,000 barrels per day) was
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
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11. Ibid.
12. The President is authorized to approve exports of crude oil that 
are in the national interest. With a few exceptions, such approval 
takes the form of a license from the Commerce Department’s 
Bureau of Industry and Security. That bureau’s policy is to 
approve certain categories of export applications—the most 
important category being exports to Canada for consumption 
or use there—and to review other applications on a case-by-case 
basis.
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Figure 5.
Natural Gas Production in the United States 
in 2013 and 2040
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 
Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy 
Outlook 2014 With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-
0383(2014) (April 2014), http://go.usa.gov/8KyF 
(PDF, 12 MB).
Note: Tcf = trillion cubic feet.
exported, essentially all of it to Canada.13 In contrast, fed-
eral policy does not restrict U.S. exports of refined petro-
leum products or of natural gas plant liquids, biofuels, 
and other nonpetroleum liquids. Together, exports of 
those fuels totaled 3.6 million barrels per day in 2013—a 
record high—with roughly half of that volume consisting 
of gasoline and diesel fuel.
Policy Options. Because U.S. supplies of crude oil have 
grown so dramatically in recent years, some policymakers 
have called for the ban on crude exports to be repealed. 
Current policy could also be changed less dramatically. 
For example, exports might be permitted not only to 
Canada but to certain other countries as well, such as 
Mexico, the countries of Central America, or all nations 
with which the United States had free-trade agreements 
(FTAs). Alternatively, the volume of allowed exports 
could be capped, or exports could be restricted to particu-
lar grades of crude oil.
Potential Effects of Those Options. Outright repeal of the 
ban on crude exports would probably lower world prices 
of oil and of liquid fuels produced from oil, but only 
slightly, and changes that left some export prohibitions 
in place would lower world prices even less. The reason 
is that prices depend on the total worldwide supply of 
crude oil, and the increase in total supply would probably 
be much smaller than the increase in the volume of 
U.S. crude exports. One recent study, for example, 
estimated that if the ban was repealed, U.S. crude exports 
would increase by as much as 1.5 million barrels per 
day, but world supply would increase by no more than 
200,000 barrels per day—less than one-quarter of 
one percent of the current total.14 Two factors explain the 
difference. First, what contributes to the total worldwide 
supply of oil is not U.S. exports but U.S. production, 
which would rise much less than exports would. For 
instance, the study estimated that if the ban was repealed 
and crude exports rose by about 1.5 million barrels per 
day, U.S. oil production would rise by only about 
500,000 barrels per day.15 (Domestic consumption would 
not change much, however, because U.S. crude imports 
would be higher as well, as the next paragraph explains.) 
Second, the net increase in world production would be 
smaller even than the increase in U.S. production, 
because the U.S. increase would drive some competing 
high-cost supplies from the market.
Perhaps counterintuitively, U.S. consumers of gasoline, 
diesel fuel, and other oil products would probably bene-
fit, along with domestic oil producers, if the ban was 
repealed; domestic refiners would be adversely affected, 
13. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum & Other 
Liquids—Exports by Destination” (accessed December 8, 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8Nvx.
2040
(37 Tcf)
2013
(24 Tcf)
Generation of Electricity
Industry
Other Sectors
Domestic
Consumption
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Net
Exports
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Natural Gas
Production
How the 13 Tcf Increase in
Production Will Be Used
14. ICF International, The Impacts of U.S. Crude Oil Exports on 
Domestic Crude Production, GDP, Employment, Trade, and Con-
sumer Costs (submitted to the American Petroleum Institute, 
March 2014), http://tinyurl.com/nnr8hxg.
15. A more recent study yielded similar findings: In its baseline pro-
jections, lifting the ban on U.S. exports of crude oil raised those 
exports by no more than 1.8 million barrels per day and world 
crude oil production by no more than 300,000 barrels per day. See 
Robert Baron and others, Economic Benefits of Lifting the Crude 
Oil Export Ban (submitted by NERA Economic Consulting to the 
Brookings Institution, September 2014), www.nera.com/
67_8673.htm.
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Figure 6.
Consumption and Supply of Natural Gas and Liquid Fuels in the United States
Source: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
Notes: Tight oil is crude oil extracted from shale and certain other dense rock formations by means of hydraulic fracturing. The category 
“Other Liquids” consists of natural gas liquids, biofuels, and processing gain (the additional barrels of petroleum produced by refining 
crude oil into heavier and lighter products).
EIA = Energy Information Administration.
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as would foreign oil producers. Consumers would benefit 
from small reductions—5 to 10 cents per gallon, in the 
baseline scenario of a recent study—in the domestic 
prices of oil products, because those prices depend pri-
marily on the world price of crude oil, which would 
decline slightly once lower-priced U.S. crudes were avail-
able in the international market.16 By contrast, the prices 
of domestic light crude oils (which include tight oils) 
seen by some U.S. crude oil producers and petroleum 
refiners would rise. Refineries in the United States are 
better configured than refineries abroad to process heavy 
crudes, so under the current ban, light crudes are less 
valuable—and therefore sell for less—in the United States 
than in the global market.17 If the ban was repealed, some 
domestic refiners would continue to buy light crudes, and 
others would increase their imports of heavy crudes; in 
either case, the cost of their crude oil inputs would be 
higher than it had been under the ban, and because they 
would continue to sell their refined products at levels 
closely linked to the world price of oil, their profits 
would fall.
Exports of Natural Gas. The United States trades signifi-
cant quantities of natural gas with Canada and Mexico. 
Using pipelines, it currently exports about 1.6 Tcf per 
year to those two countries, and it imports about 2.9 Tcf 
per year, virtually all of it from Canada.18 The pipelines 
through which gas travels between Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico create a unified North American 
market in which the price of gas is determined by the 
total supply and demand of all three countries. Once the 
United States is a net pipeline exporter, as EIA projects it 
will be within a decade, domestic gas prices will be higher 
than they would be without pipeline exports.19
The only way to transport significant volumes of natural 
gas to countries that are not connected to the United 
States by gas pipelines is to liquefy the gas and move it by 
ship. The United States has very little capacity to do that, 
because it was expected until recently to be a substantial 
importer for decades to come.20 But as hydraulic fractur-
ing and related technologies have become widespread in 
the United States, natural gas has become much cheaper 
here than in foreign markets; in 2013, average gas prices 
were about three times higher in Europe and about four 
times higher in Japan, both of which are large gas con-
sumers.21 Such price differences, if they last, could make 
selling LNG overseas profitable, despite the significant 
cost of liquefying natural gas, transporting it, and con-
verting it back into gaseous form.
Policy Options. Restrictions on gas trade by pipeline are 
not allowed under the free-trade agreements that the 
United States has with Canada and Mexico. Exports of 
LNG, however, are subject to restrictions under current 
law, which the Congress could modify in various ways.
Currently, the construction of facilities to liquefy and 
export natural gas requires approval from the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the exports 
themselves must be approved by the Department of 
Energy (DOE). Prospective exporters can apply for blan-
ket authority to ship LNG to countries in either or both 
of two groups: those with FTAs with the United States 
that cover natural gas and those without such agreements. 
16. Ibid.
17. For example, for more than three years, the price of West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI)—a domestically produced light crude whose 
price is used as a benchmark for the prices of other U.S. crude 
oils—has been lower than the price of Brent, a North Sea oil that 
is broadly representative of other world crude supplies, despite the 
fact that WTI is higher-quality and usually slightly more expen-
sive. Without the ban on U.S. crude exports, the relationship 
between those prices would more closely reflect the historical pat-
tern, so that the price of WTI would rise relative to that of Brent.
18. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Natural Gas Exports 
and Re-Exports by Country” (accessed November 4, 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/NfKF, and “U.S. Natural Gas Imports by 
Country” (accessed November 4, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/Nf8B. 
A major reason that the United States both exports gas to Canada 
and imports gas from it is that some of the imports are reexported 
to Canada. Because it has limited pipeline infrastructure to move 
gas from its western regions, where most of its gas is produced, to 
its east, Canada serves its eastern demand by exporting gas to the 
western United States and importing it from the eastern United 
States.
19. The United States has not been a net pipeline exporter since the 
1950s. By 2040, EIA expects pipeline exports to triple and 
imports to decline by 30 percent. See Energy Information Admin-
istration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With Projections to 2040, 
DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), http://go.usa.gov/8KyF 
(PDF, 12 MB).
20. Only one LNG export facility is currently operating in the United 
States, and it is scheduled to export less than 0.1 Tcf of LNG over 
the next two years. See ConocoPhillips, “Kenai LNG Exports” 
(accessed August 25, 2014), http://tinyurl.com/o36tdo7.
21. World Bank, “World Bank Commodities Price Data (The Pink 
Sheet)” (December 2, 2014), http://tinyurl.com/qjbfqmf (PDF, 
233 KB).
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Exports to countries without FTAs, which account for 
roughly 80 percent of LNG imports worldwide, require 
DOE to determine that the exports would be in the pub-
lic interest; DOE regards LNG exports to FTA countries 
as automatically being in the public interest.
As of October 2014, four LNG export terminals, pro-
posed for Louisiana, Maryland, and Texas, had received 
approval for construction and for exports to countries 
without FTAs; if those terminals are built in the next sev-
eral years, their combined capacity of about 2.5 Tcf will 
represent roughly 8 percent of North American gas con-
sumption. Four more facilities, proposed for Florida, 
Louisiana, and Oregon and having a combined capacity 
of 1.5 Tcf, have recently been authorized by DOE to 
export LNG to countries without FTAs, but none of 
them have received approval for construction from 
FERC. All told, the roughly 30 applications that have 
sought full approval from FERC and DOE would create 
facilities that could export about 13 Tcf of LNG per year, 
an amount equal to roughly 40 percent of the natural gas 
consumed in North America.22
If the Congress wanted to change LNG export capacity, 
it could alter the criteria for DOE’s approval of such 
exports to countries without FTAs. For example, it could 
require DOE to treat applications to export to those 
countries the same way that it treats applications to 
export to FTA countries—that is, automatically assuming 
that they are in the public interest. Such a change would 
speed the review process and make approvals more likely. 
Alternatively, the Congress could change the federal 
review process to make approvals of LNG exports less 
likely. For instance, when determining whether to allow 
LNG exports to a country without an FTA with the 
United States that covered natural gas, DOE could be 
required to give particular weight to the effects that the 
resulting higher domestic gas prices would have on low-
income households in this country.
Potential Effects of Those Options. If the pending applica-
tions were approved, and export capacity of 13 Tcf per 
year was built and fully used, that 40 percent decline in 
supply in North America would boost gas prices consid-
erably (unless suppliers greatly increased production in 
response to even a small price increase). But that much 
capacity might be approved without being built or fully 
used, in which case the actual volume of LNG exports 
might be much smaller. Whether approval of facilities led 
to construction and use would depend heavily on 
whether the difference between North American and 
overseas gas prices remained large enough to justify the 
costs of producing and exporting LNG.
On the one hand, today’s large price gap could narrow—
for example, if some new LNG facilities began operating, 
increasing the supply of natural gas overseas and reducing 
its price there while raising it here. The price gap could 
also narrow if major foreign suppliers of natural gas 
increased production to protect their market share; if 
new overseas gas resources, particularly shale gas, came to 
market; or if North American demand grew faster than 
supply. On the other hand, the price gap could widen 
further in the future, giving domestic firms an even big-
ger incentive to export gas—if, for example, worldwide 
demand for gas remained high but little additional LNG 
liquefaction and export capacity was built outside North 
America, or if North American gas supplies grew faster 
than demand.
A 2012 study commissioned by DOE analyzed future gas 
prices in various scenarios with different supply and 
demand conditions and different amounts of available 
export capacity. Most of the scenarios showed a future 
gap between U.S. and international gas prices too small 
to create much overseas demand for U.S. LNG; exports 
in those scenarios were accordingly small or nonexistent, 
even if a large amount of export capacity was approved.23 
Those findings were broadly confirmed in a 2014 update 
of the study (not commissioned by DOE), which found 
that under expected supply and demand conditions, 
allowing 2 Tcf or more of export capacity would result in 
only a 2 percent to 5 percent increase in domestic gas 
prices.24 However, in scenarios in which sizable export 
capacity was approved and fully used, domestic prices 
would rise more sharply. For example, the more recent 
study estimated that with exports of about 4 Tcf per 
22. Department of Energy, “Summary of LNG Export Applications 
of the Lower 48 States” (accessed November 4, 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/KfYj.
23. W. David Montgomery and others, Macroeconomic Impacts 
of LNG Exports From the United States (submitted by NERA 
Economic Consulting to the Department of Energy, 
December 2012), http://go.usa.gov/KfGd (PDF, 4 MB).
24. Robert Baron and others, Updated Macroeconomic Impacts of 
LNG Exports From the United States (submitted by NERA Eco-
nomic Consulting to Cheniere Energy, Inc., March 2014), 
http://tinyurl.com/p5vcjl9.
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year—an amount consistent with the capacity of projects 
already approved by DOE, including those awaiting 
approval from FERC—domestic natural gas prices would 
probably be about 15 percent higher than they would 
have been with no export capacity. It also estimated that 
with exports of about 13 Tcf per year—roughly the 
capacity of all LNG facilities that have been approved or 
are currently seeking approval—prices would be 30 per-
cent to 45 percent higher. But to support such high 
exports, overseas demand for LNG from the United 
States or U.S. supplies of shale resources (or both) would 
have to be much higher than projected by EIA at the time 
the studies were conducted.
EIA’s most recent projection, which CBO uses in its base-
line scenario, has the United States exporting about 2 Tcf 
per year of LNG by 2020 and about 3.5 Tcf by 2040.25 
Taking into account differences in the economic condi-
tions underlying EIA’s projection and those underlying 
the studies discussed above, CBO estimates that the pro-
jected 3.5 Tcf of exports would increase domestic gas 
prices in 2040 by 10 percent or less, relative to the prices 
that would exist with no exports of LNG.26
To the extent that market conditions supported LNG 
exports, making capacity available to allow those exports 
would raise GDP—in part because more domestic 
gas would be produced, but also because the gas would be 
sold overseas at higher prices than at home. However, 
that increased GDP would not accrue to people in 
the United States uniformly. Higher prices for gas 
exported overseas would mean greater profits for U.S. gas 
producers; but the fact that domestic prices, too, would 
rise would mean that U.S. gas consumers faced higher 
costs. One of the studies mentioned above estimated that 
an increase in North American gas prices of $1 per mil-
lion British thermal units, or Btus (about five times the 
increase found in the baseline scenario of the 2014 
update to the DOE study), would increase costs for gas 
and electricity by $50 per year for U.S. households with 
annual income less than $20,000 and by $90 per year for 
those with annual income above $100,000.27 Some 
households—for example, those that owned shares of 
companies that produced gas, those that owned land in 
gas-rich areas, and those with members employed in the 
gas industry—would enjoy higher income that at least 
partly offset, if not outweighed, the increased gas and 
electricity costs.
Another effect of LNG exports would be to increase the 
integration of the North American gas market with the 
European and Asian markets. That would both increase 
the exposure of domestic consumers to supply shocks 
overseas and ameliorate the domestic effects of reductions 
in North American supplies. However, a full consider-
ation of the effects of LNG exports on household income 
and market integration is beyond the scope of this 
report.28
Uncertainty in the Projections
Projections of shale development’s impact on energy mar-
kets are inherently uncertain. A recent illustration of the 
uncertainty was EIA’s energy market forecast in 2012, 
which projected that 2013 tight oil and shale gas produc-
tion would total 0.9 million barrels per day and 7.6 Tcf, 
respectively.29 The agency now expects 2013 production 
to have totaled 3.5 million barrels per day and 9.4 Tcf.30
25. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
26. CBO’s calculation combined information from two sources: pro-
jections of future gas prices and production levels from EIA’s 
Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With Projections to 2040; and esti-
mates of the price sensitivity of gas production and of the relation-
ship between gas production and LNG exports from Robert 
Baron and others, Updated Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG 
Exports From the United States.
27. Michael Levi, A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports, 
Discussion Paper 2012-04 (Brookings Institution, June 2012), 
http://tinyurl.com/nsxo7zo. The study’s estimates were based on 
EIA’s Residential Energy Consumption Survey for 2005, the latest 
information available at the time. Using data now available for 
2009 does not materially affect those average costs. See Energy 
Information Administration, “Residential Energy Consumption 
Survey” (2009), Table CE2.1, http://go.usa.gov/8Kvz (XLS, 
52 KB).
28. Other policy considerations not discussed here include the effects 
of extending the benefits of trade in natural gas to countries that 
do not agree to certain provisions that generally accompany free-
trade agreements (such as safer conditions for workers and envi-
ronmental protection) and the possibility that some actions that 
the United States might take to constrain LNG exports could 
prompt international challenges under the rules of the World 
Trade Organization.
29. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2012 
With Projections to 2035, DOE/EIA-0383(2012) (June 2012), 
http://go.usa.gov/7dhz.
30. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
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There are many reasons for the uncertainty. Some involve 
the future availability of shale resources and others the 
future demand for those resources. Uncertainty also exists 
about the factors that have affected recent gas prices, and 
those factors influence estimates of future prices.
The Availability of Shale Resources. The main reason for 
the difficulty of projecting the market effects of shale 
development, CBO believes, is uncertainty about the 
future availability of shale resources. To estimate future 
availability, analysts must assess three items, each of 
which is itself uncertain:
 The total quantity of shale resources in the ground; 
 The quantity of technically recoverable resources at 
various points in the future, which is the fraction of 
total resources that could be recovered at each of those 
points with the technology then available; and
 The costs of developing those technically recoverable 
resources (which are relevant to future availability 
because developers would not extract resources that 
could be developed only at an exorbitant cost).
What makes the first two items uncertain is clear: Not all 
shale resources have been identified, and improvements 
in technology are difficult to predict. In 2011, for exam-
ple, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) released an 
estimate of technically recoverable shale gas from the 
Marcellus Shale that, because hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling had made more resources recoverable, 
was about 40 times larger than its previous estimate, 
which was issued in 2003.31 However, in its annual esti-
mates, EIA had expected even greater growth, so it low-
ered its estimate of the shale gas present in the Marcellus 
by about 65 percent after considering the USGS find-
ing.32 Similarly, on the basis of production trends and a 
revised understanding of the area’s geology, EIA recently 
lowered its estimate of technically recoverable tight oil 
reserves in California’s Monterey Shale formation by 
96 percent.33
The third item, the cost of developing technically recov-
erable resources, is uncertain for many reasons. One is 
that limited information exists about the rate at which 
tight oil and shale gas wells become less productive over 
time. Initial evidence suggests that production declines 
much more rapidly for tight oil and shale gas wells than 
for conventional oil and gas wells; some estimates suggest 
that it falls 80 percent or more over the first three years 
of operation. However, because shale wells have not been 
in operation very long, it is difficult to draw firm conclu-
sions about their lifetime rates of production. If the pro-
ductivity of tight oil and shale gas wells turns out to 
decline more slowly than experts project, current esti-
mates will have overstated the cost of producing a given 
quantity of shale energy from a given quantity of 
resources. The reverse will be the case if productivity 
declines more quickly than expected.
Another reason that production costs are uncertain is that 
limited information is available about the distribution of 
well productivity. A recent analysis found that the 
amount of shale gas that new wells in the same rock for-
mation yielded in the first few months was distributed 
very unevenly, with high production from relatively few 
wells and low production from the rest.34 As production 
diminishes in the areas that were developed first because 
they were considered the most promising, and as develop-
ment moves into other areas, the percentage of wells that 
are highly productive may fall, raising the cost of finding 
such wells and thus the average cost of developing shale 
resources. Alternatively, if exploration methods improve, 
the percentage of wells that are highly productive may 
increase.
The Demand for Shale Energy. Domestic and foreign 
demand for shale energy depends on many uncertain fac-
tors, such as population growth, economic growth, the 
cost of conventional oil and gas, the cost of other com-
peting energy sources, and the energy intensity of the 
economy (that is, the average amount of energy used in
31. James L. Coleman and others, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and 
Gas Resources of the Devonian Marcellus Shale of the Appalachian 
Basin Province, 2011, FS 2011-3092 (U.S. Geological Survey, 
August 2011), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3092/.
32. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2012 
With Projections to 2035, DOE/EIA-0383(2012) (June 2012), 
http://go.usa.gov/7dhz.
33. Louis Sahagun, “U.S. Officials Cut Estimate of Recoverable 
Monterey Shale Oil by 96%,” Los Angeles Times (May 20, 2014), 
http://tinyurl.com/pnknuct.
34. J. David Hughes, Drill, Baby, Drill: Can Unconventional Fuels 
Usher in a New Era of Energy Abundance? (Post Carbon Institute, 
February 2013), www.postcarbon.org/drill-baby-drill/.
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producing a dollar’s worth of GDP).35 None of those fac-
tors can be forecast with precision. For instance, driving 
habits in the future, the supply of conventional oil and 
gas, and the cost of generating electricity from renewable 
fuels might differ from what is currently expected. Projec-
tions of foreign demand are subject to additional uncer-
tainty about transportation costs, other costs of trade, 
and foreign governments’ trade policies.
The Factors Influencing Recent Gas Prices. Still another 
source of uncertainty in estimates of the effects of shale 
development involves the extent to which the recent 
declines in gas prices reflect factors other than the 
increased availability of shale gas. At least three such fac-
tors may be at work. First, the recent recession and slow 
economic recovery have reduced gas prices by reducing 
demand. Second, producers may be supplying more gas 
than they would have otherwise, given current prices, 
because of the boom in gas development that occurred in 
the second half of the last decade, when gas prices were 
much higher. Third, gas production is being supported 
by oil prices, which have been fairly high until recently. 
Gas producers in areas rich in natural gas plant liquids—
which, as this report noted earlier, are sometimes 
obtained in the production of shale gas and are good sub-
stitutes for certain petroleum products—have been will-
ing to produce and sell natural gas at a loss so that they 
can obtain those liquids, the prices of which are more 
closely linked to the price of crude oil than to the price of 
natural gas.36
The more those three factors (or others) have been 
responsible for today’s low gas prices, the smaller a role 
has been played by the current availability of shale 
gas, and the more estimates may overstate the future 
sensitivity of gas prices to the availability of shale gas. 
Suppose, for instance, that more of the decline in gas 
prices since 2008 resulted from the economic slowdown 
than a particular model accounts for, and that less 
resulted from the growth of shale gas availability. In that 
case, the model would have overestimated the past effects 
of shale gas availability on prices, and projections based 
on that model would similarly overestimate the future 
effects of shale gas availability on prices.
Effects on Economic Output
In the long run, CBO estimates, the development of 
shale resources will lead to higher GDP by increasing the 
productivity of existing labor and capital and by increas-
ing the amount of labor and capital in use. Specifically, 
CBO projects that real GDP will be 0.7 percent higher in 
2020 and 0.9 percent higher in 2040 than it would have 
been without shale development.
In recent years, shale development has probably had a 
larger effect on GDP, having employed labor and capital 
that would otherwise have been unused because of weak 
demand for goods and services. That larger effect will 
probably persist over the next few years—that is, as long 
as interest rates remain low and output remains distinctly 
below its maximum sustainable level. But after output 
moves back toward its maximum sustainable level, labor 
and capital used to produce shale resources or gas-
intensive goods will mostly be drawn away from the pro-
duction of other goods and services, which means that 
shale development will have a smaller net effect on GDP.
In the Next Few Years
Shale development has boosted GDP in recent years and 
will continue to do so. However, CBO has not quantified 
the effect over the next few years, because shale develop-
ment’s short-term effects on the economy, other than on 
the output of oil and gas, are especially difficult to mea-
sure. Those effects include increased investment in the oil 
and gas industry and in industries that support it; 
increased investment and production in other industries 
because energy prices are lower than they would other-
wise be; and increased demand for goods and services 
because of greater household income—all of which 
increase GDP. Shale development also reduces the 
amount of labor and capital available for other uses and 
reduces the production of energy from conventional 
resources; those effects reduce GDP.
35. Consumers who want to purchase gas or oil do not specifically 
demand shale gas or tight oil. Here, “demand for shale energy” at a 
given price refers to the excess of demand for the fuel at that price 
above the amount of the fuel supplied from conventional 
resources.
36. Researchers recently concluded that a highly productive gas well 
in the Barnett Shale required a price of about $3 per million 
British thermal units (mmBtu) of gas to generate a 10 percent rate 
of return in the absence of natural gas plant liquids, but only 
about 50 cents per mmBtu if such liquids were present. See 
Peter Behr, “Barnett Shale Has Surprisingly More to Give, 
Texas Researchers Find,” EnergyWire (September 25, 2013), 
www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1059987786.
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Increased Output of Oil and Gas. Shale development has 
increased U.S. output of tight oil and shale gas, raising 
GDP. The market value of shale gas produced in 2013 
(reflecting the contributions of both the gas industry and 
the other industries that supply goods and services used 
to produce shale gas) was about $35 billion. In the same 
year, the market value of tight oil, including natural 
gas plant liquids produced by hydraulic fracturing, was 
about $160 billion. Combined, sales of shale gas and tight 
oil therefore totaled about $195 billion, or roughly 
1.2 percent of GDP.
Increased Investment in the Oil and Gas Industry and in 
Supporting Industries. Shale development has probably 
raised GDP in recent years through greater spending on 
the development of new wells. Between 2004 and 2012, 
investment in the oil and gas extraction industry 
increased from 0.4 percent of GDP to 0.9 percent.37 
However, that increase included investment in conven-
tional oil production that probably would have occurred 
even without shale development because of the sharp rise 
in oil prices over that period. CBO did not estimate how 
much of the increase in investment could be attributed to 
shale development.
In addition, industries that support the oil and gas sector 
have spent more on new facilities and equipment, such as 
pipelines and trains, as a result of shale development. 
CBO did not quantify that increase in investment either.
Increased Investment and Production in Other 
Industries. Industries that use natural gas intensively—
such as the steel, petrochemical, fertilizer, and electricity 
industries—have expanded production to take advantage 
of energy prices that are lower than they would have been 
without shale development. Such industries have become 
more competitive internationally because of the fall in 
energy prices in the United States: A number of new U.S. 
petrochemical and fertilizer facilities are being planned, 
for example, and one company is in the process of mov-
ing two methanol plants from Chile to Louisiana.38 
Thus, shale development has boosted GDP by raising 
investment in, and production from, energy-intensive 
industries—but it is very difficult to estimate the magni-
tude of that effect.39
Increased Demand. Higher employment resulting from 
shale development, along with a larger capital stock 
resulting from increased investment in the development 
and use of shale resources, has led to higher household 
income and thus greater demand for goods and services. 
Some of that increased demand has been met by the addi-
tional production from the energy-intensive industries 
described above. However, much of the increase has been 
for products supplied by firms that do not directly benefit 
from lower natural gas and oil prices. In order to meet the 
increased demand, those firms have increased employ-
ment and investment, which has raised GDP still further 
in the short term.
Less Labor and Capital Available for Other Uses. The 
effects described above have shifted some workers and 
capital away from other uses, which means that some eco-
nomic activity has been forgone. That forgone output has 
partly offset shale development’s positive effects on GDP. 
Although CBO has not quantified the forgone output, 
the fact that the economy’s slow recovery from the recent 
recession has left many resources underused suggests that 
the amount is small.
Less Production From and Investment in Conventional 
Energy Resources. As shale development has made 
energy prices lower than they would have been otherwise, 
the production of gas and oil from some conventional 
supplies has become unprofitable and has therefore been 
abandoned, and some investment in conventional sources 
of gas and oil has not been undertaken. Similarly, electric 
utilities’ substitution of natural gas for coal has reduced 
production from and investment in coal mining. The for-
gone production and investment, like the reduced output 
from sectors that lost labor and capital, has partly offset 
shale development’s positive effects on GDP. CBO 
37. CBO calculated that increase with data from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, “Fixed Assets Accounts Tables,” Table 3.7ESI 
(accessed September 20, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/vwCC.
38. Methanex Corporation, Annual Report 2013 (Methanex, 
March 2014), http://tinyurl.com/lwhxkma (PDF, 601 KB).
39. According to one report, the effect of hydraulic fracturing on 
investment by energy-intensive industries has been small so far but 
could grow in the future; see Jan Hatzius and others, Is the Econ-
omy Gaining “Fracktion?” US Economics Analyst 13/42 (Goldman 
Sachs, October 2013). Another has found that the fall in the price 
of natural gas since 2006 is associated with a 2 percent to 
3 percent increase in activity for the entire manufacturing sector; 
see William R. Melick, The Energy Boom and Manufacturing in the 
United States, International Finance Discussion Papers 1108 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/vvDW (PDF, 672 KB).
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estimates that conventional gas production falls by about 
one-tenth the amount of an increase in shale gas produc-
tion, which means that the resulting loss in GDP in 2013 
was probably small.40 The effect of reduced investment in 
conventional energy on GDP in 2013 is harder to 
quantify.
In the Longer Term
Shale development will raise GDP in the longer term in 
two ways: increasing the productivity of existing labor 
and capital, and increasing the amount of labor and 
capital in use. CBO estimates that, as a result, real GDP 
will be 0.7 percent higher in 2020 and 0.9 percent 
higher in 2040 than it would have been without shale 
development, although those estimates are subject to 
considerable uncertainty.41 The longer-term effects of 
shale development on GDP will probably be smaller than 
the near-term effects described above (see Box 1).
Increased Productivity. Shale development raises GDP 
by increasing the productivity of labor and capital. 
That increased productivity is projected to make GDP 
0.4 percent higher in 2020 and 0.5 percent higher in 
2040 than it would have been in the absence of shale 
development.
Some of the increased productivity comes from the labor 
and capital used in shale development itself, which are 
more productive because of hydraulic fracturing and hor-
izontal drilling than they would have been without those 
techniques. CBO estimates that the value of the tight oil 
and shale gas produced in both 2020 and 2040 will be 
about 1.3 percent of real GDP. But in the absence of 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, CBO 
estimates, the labor and capital now projected to be used 
to produce that output would contribute only about 
1.0 percent to GDP in 2020 and about 0.9 percent in 
2040. The boost to GDP from reallocating labor and 
capital into the production of tight oil and shale gas is the 
difference between those estimates: about 0.3 percent of 
GDP in 2020 and 0.4 percent in 2040. (For details about 
that estimate and others in this section of the report, see 
Appendix B.)
Another component of the increased productivity result-
ing from shale development comes from replacing high-
cost conventional oil and gas with shale resources. 
Because less labor and capital are now required to pro-
duce the same amount of oil and gas, the shift frees up 
labor and capital, which are used to produce other goods, 
thereby increasing GDP. However, because the reduction 
in conventional oil and gas will be modest, the resulting 
increase in GDP will be small in both 2020 and 2040.
The rest of the increased productivity comes from labor 
and capital that are used more efficiently elsewhere in the 
economy because of increased consumption of oil and 
gas. As energy-intensive products and methods of pro-
duction grow cheaper, the same amount of output can be 
produced with less labor and capital. For example, as the 
cost of generating electricity from gas has fallen, some 
electric utilities have increased their productivity by 
switching from coal to gas. Through such shifts, GDP 
will be about 0.1 percent higher in both 2020 and 2040 
than it would have been without shale development, 
CBO estimates.
Higher output would also result if shale development led 
manufacturing to become a larger share of the economy 
and if labor was generally more productive in manufac-
turing than in other sectors. However, recent earnings 
data do not demonstrate that labor productivity is higher 
in manufacturing. Although the average weekly earnings 
of employees in manufacturing were higher than those of 
all private-sector employees in 2013, hourly earnings 
were about the same, meaning that most of the difference 
in weekly earnings was due to a longer average workweek 
in manufacturing.
Increased Total Labor and Capital. Shale development 
will also raise GDP by increasing the amounts of labor 
and capital used in the economy, in CBO’s assessment. 
That increase will happen in at least two ways. First, the 
increase in output generated by higher productivity that 
40. That CBO estimate is based on Energy Information Administra-
tion, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With Projections to 2040, 
DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), http://go.usa.gov/8KyF 
(PDF, 12 MB).
41. Those estimates assume no restrictions on exports of LNG in 
2020 and beyond. If the difference between domestic and overseas 
gas prices increased demand for U.S. exports of LNG, but those 
exports were constrained because federal permits had not been 
issued, the increases in GDP would be lower. Such a constraint 
would keep domestic LNG prices lower than they would be other-
wise, which would benefit domestic businesses and households 
that used gas; however, those benefits would not fully offset the 
loss to gas producers. See W. David Montgomery and others, 
Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports From the United States 
(submitted by NERA Economic Consulting to the Department of 
Energy, December 2012), http://go.usa.gov/KfGd (PDF, 4 MB).
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was described above will result in additional income; part 
of that income will be saved and then invested, increasing 
the capital stock. Second, the higher productivity will 
increase wages, improving the return to workers from 
each hour of work and encouraging them to work more. 
Because of those effects, CBO estimates, GDP will be 
0.3 percent higher in 2020 and about 0.4 percent 
higher in 2040 than it would have been without shale 
development.42
Other effects of shale development on the total amounts 
of labor and capital (and in turn on GDP) are highly 
uncertain, so CBO did not estimate them. For example, 
if the industries that produce and use natural gas and oil, 
or those that supply infrastructure for shale development, 
are more capital-intensive than those that see production 
fall as a result of shale development, the demand for capi-
tal and thus the overall return on investment in the 
United States will be higher. That higher rate of return 
will lead to increases in private saving and in capital 
inflows from abroad. But under the same circumstances, 
companies’ desire to replace labor with capital will reduce 
the return to working, reducing the labor supply.
Other Considerations. Two more considerations should 
be mentioned that are related to shale development’s 
effects on the economy in the longer term. One involves 
a reduction in the dollar cost of U.S. imports; the other 
involves uncertainty in the estimates of economic effects.
Box 1.
Why the Economic Effects of Shale Development Will Be Larger in the Near Term
The positive effects of shale development on gross 
domestic product (GDP) are partly offset by output 
that is forgone when labor and capital are shifted 
away from other uses. That offsetting effect has not 
been large so far, in the Congressional Budget Office’s 
assessment, because the economy’s slow recovery 
from the recent recession has left many resources 
unused. However, the effect will be larger once the 
economy moves back toward producing its maximum 
sustainable level of output. At that point, the labor 
and capital shifted into the production of shale 
resources or energy-intensive goods and services will 
mostly be drawn away from the production of other 
goods and services. Consequently, shale develop-
ment’s net effect on GDP is likely to be smaller in the 
longer term than in the near term.
The redistribution of labor and capital will occur in 
various ways. For example, some higher-cost produc-
tion of natural gas from conventional resources will 
become unprofitable, pushing labor and capital else-
where. The composition of domestic production will 
shift toward energy-intensive manufacturing and 
away from other industries. And increased net 
exports of natural gas and oil will boost the value of 
the dollar, making goods produced in the United 
States more expensive relative to U.S. imports and 
therefore leading to reduced production of those 
goods. (Economists refer to that phenomenon as 
Dutch disease, remembering the discovery in 1959 of 
the Groningen gas field in the Netherlands, which led 
to large exports of natural gas and a surge in the value 
of the Dutch currency in the late 1960s and early 
1970s—and thereby made Dutch manufacturing less 
competitive.) The increase in the value of the dollar 
will probably be small, but it will affect all U.S. 
exports and imports and would probably have a dis-
cernible effect on the economy.
A recent study illustrates the difference between shale 
development’s effects on GDP in the near term and 
in the longer term. An average of the conservative 
and optimistic scenarios in the study indicates that 
shale resources are expected to boost maximum sus-
tainable GDP by 0.65 percent and actual GDP by 
1.35 percent between 2013 and 2020. The difference 
between those estimates illustrates the additional 
response of GDP to shale development when the 
economy is not operating at its maximum sustainable 
level of output.1
1. See Trevor Houser and Shashank Mohan, Fueling Up: The 
Economic Implications of America’s Oil and Gas Boom (Peter-
son Institute for International Economics, 2014), Chapter 4, 
http://bookstore.piie.com/book-store/6567.html.
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The Cost of Imports. Shale development confers an eco-
nomic benefit that raises the standard of living in the 
United States but does not show up as greater GDP. Spe-
cifically, increased net exports of natural gas and oil boost 
the value of the dollar, making imports cheaper and 
allowing consumers to buy more and businesses to invest 
more for a given quantity of exports and a given amount 
of GDP. CBO has not quantified that effect, however.
Uncertainty. CBO’s estimates of shale development’s 
effects on GDP are accompanied by significant uncer-
tainty of various kinds. The estimates rest on baseline 
projections of the prices of shale gas and tight oil, of the 
quantities of those fuels produced in the United States, 
and of the profitability of that production—and as is 
explained earlier (in the section “Uncertainty in the 
Projections”), all of those projections are uncertain, 
because of underlying uncertainty about demand for 
natural gas and oil, demand for other forms of energy, 
the availability of shale resources, and exploration and 
production technology.
CBO therefore estimated the effects of shale development 
not only according to those baseline projections but also 
under two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, 
prices, production, and profitability are all lower than 
projected in the baseline. Prices of natural gas and oil 
(reflecting recent EIA projections of price uncertainty) 
are about 25 percent lower in 2015 than they are in the 
baseline projection, then grow more slowly than they do 
in the baseline, and are about 50 percent lower by 2040. 
The production of shale gas and tight oil is about 
40 percent lower than in the baseline by 2040, a figure 
that is consistent with what EIA calls its low-resource 
scenario. And the average cost of producing shale gas rises 
75 percent as quickly as the price of natural gas, com-
pared with 50 percent as quickly in CBO’s baseline pro-
jection.43
In the second alternative scenario, the three factors are all 
higher than projected in the baseline. The prices of natu-
ral gas and oil start out about 35 percent higher than they 
are in CBO’s baseline projection and grow to be roughly 
50 percent higher.44 The production of shale gas and 
tight oil is about 40 percent higher than in the baseline 
by 2040; and profitability is higher because the average 
cost of producing shale gas rises only 25 percent as fast as 
the price of natural gas.
In the first scenario, shale development makes real GDP 
0.4 percent higher in 2020 and 0.3 percent higher in 
2040 than it would have been otherwise. (The effect is 
smaller in 2040 because the economy then will be larger 
relative to the market value of shale energy in the sce-
nario.) In the second scenario, GDP is 1.3 percent higher 
in 2020 and nearly 2 percent higher in 2040 because of 
shale development.
Effects on the Federal Budget
The development of shale resources affects two kinds of 
federal receipts. The first, federal tax revenues, rise as 
shale development boosts GDP. The second, payments to 
the government by private developers of federally owned 
resources, also increase with shale development—but not 
much, because most of the nation’s shale gas and tight oil 
is not owned by the federal government.
42. Some researchers have estimated that shale resources will have a 
much larger impact on the total amount of labor and capital used 
in the economy in 2020, resulting in a much larger impact on 
GDP. For example, one report estimates that shale energy could 
add a net 1.7 million permanent jobs by 2020 and boost GDP 
by 2 percent to 4 percent; see Susan Lund and others, Game 
Changers: Five Opportunities for US Growth and Renewal 
(McKinsey & Company, July 2013), http://tinyurl.com/mazev4d. 
Another report estimates that new energy supply may create 
2.7 million to 3.6 million jobs by 2020, on net, and boost GDP 
by 2 percent to 3 percent; see Edward L. Morse and others, Energy 
2020: North America, the New Middle East? (Citigroup, March 
2012), http://tinyurl.com/mo7k7dt. Those researchers’ estimates 
of net jobs created are much higher than CBO’s. The difference 
probably arises because the other researchers think that labor sup-
ply responds more strongly to increases in wages; that in 2020, the 
economy will still not be producing its maximum sustainable level 
of output (so underused labor could still be drawn into shale 
development without reducing the labor available to other indus-
tries); or both. For a detailed discussion of CBO’s estimating 
approach, see Appendix B.
43. That average cost will rise because more costly resources will be 
profitable to develop as natural gas prices rise. The projection that 
it will rise more slowly than natural gas prices is consistent with 
EIA projections that shale gas will continue to grow as a share of 
overall U.S. gas production.
44. The larger initial departure from baseline prices—35 percent, 
compared with 25 percent in the first scenario—is consistent with 
EIA’s recent price forecasts, which in turn reflect market expecta-
tions (shown in futures prices and trading prices for options con-
tracts) that near-term prices have more potential to be higher than 
expected than to be lower than expected. See Energy Information 
Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook (November 2014), 
www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/outlook.cfm.
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Tax Revenues
The development of shale resources has increased eco-
nomic activity in recent years and will continue to do so, 
as the previous section explains. That increased activity is 
reflected in higher income of various kinds, such as wages 
and salaries, income from partnerships and sole propri-
etorships, dividends, and corporate profits. And because 
that higher income is subject to a combination of individ-
ual income taxes, corporate income taxes, and payroll 
taxes, shale development increases federal tax revenues 
as well.
CBO expects the effect of shale development on revenues 
to be slightly higher in percentage terms than the effect 
on GDP. As the previous section also mentions, CBO 
estimates that real GDP will be 0.7 percent higher in 
2020 and 0.9 percent higher in 2040 than it would have 
been without shale development. On the basis of that 
increase in GDP, CBO estimates that revenues will be 
higher by 0.8 percent (or about $35 billion) in 2020 and 
by 1.0 percent in 2040 than they would have been with-
out shale development.45
In arriving at those rough estimates for 2020 and 2040, 
CBO assumed that the net effect of shale development on 
GDP would be allocated among the various types of tax-
able and nontaxable income, and across households in 
different tax brackets, in the same proportions in which 
overall GDP was expected to be allocated. Because the 
United States has a progressive individual income tax 
system—that is, one in which income in higher brackets 
is taxed at higher rates—that assumption led to the con-
clusion that shale development would have a greater 
effect on revenues than on GDP, in percentage terms. 
(By contrast, if the GDP added by shale development was 
unusually concentrated among people in the lowest tax 
bracket, shale development might have a smaller percent-
age impact on revenues than on GDP.)
Payments for Federally Owned Resources
The federal government receives payments from private 
developers of federally owned oil and gas. In the case of 
onshore oil and gas, about 90 percent of the payments are 
royalties on production; the rest are payments to obtain 
leases and rent on leases not yet put into production. 
All of the payments go initially to the U.S. Treasury, but 
under current law, the federal government generally pays 
about half to the states from which the resources were 
extracted. After adjusting for those payments to states, 
CBO estimates that net federal royalties from all onshore 
oil and gas leases will average about $1.4 billion a year 
over the 2015–2024 period.46
The portion of those royalties attributable to tight oil and 
shale gas production is uncertain because the government 
does not supply data breaking down production from 
federal lands by geologic formation. However, on the 
basis of information from state agencies and EIA, CBO 
estimates that in 2012, shale gas probably accounted for 
about 3 percent of onshore natural gas produced from 
federal land and tight oil for about 25 percent of onshore 
oil produced from federal land. Those estimates accord 
with the observation that few of the country’s current and 
potential sources of shale gas and tight oil lie beneath 
federally owned land (see Figure 7).47 For example, the 
Rocky Mountain region, which accounts for almost all of 
the natural gas (including shale gas) produced on federal 
land, is a minor source of the nation’s supply of shale gas, 
yielding less than 1 percent of the total through 2024, 
according to EIA’s projections. 
45. Congressional Budget Office, Updated Budget Projections: 2014 to 
2024 (April 2014), www.cbo.gov/publication/45229, and The 
2014 Long-Term Budget Outlook (July 2014), www.cbo.gov/
publication/45471.
46. That figure is based on Congressional Budget Office, An Update to 
the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024 (August 2014), 
www.cbo.gov/publication/45653. The 2015–2024 period is 
CBO’s standard 10-year projection period.
47. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2012 
With Projections to 2035, DOE/EIA-0383(2012) (June 2012), 
p. 57, http://go.usa.gov/7dhz; David W. Houseknecht and others, 
Assessment of Potential Oil and Gas Resources in Source Rocks of the 
Alaska North Slope, 2012, FS-2012-3013 (U.S. Geological Survey, 
February 2012), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3013/; and 
David W. Houseknecht, Assessment of Potential Oil and Gas 
Resources in Source Rocks (Shale) of the Alaska North Slope 2012—
Overview of Geology and Results (U.S. Geological Survey, 2012), 
pp. 5, 7–9, http://go.usa.gov/KfeH (PDF, 4 MB).
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Figure 7.
Shale Formations and Federal Land in the United States
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Energy Information Administration, “Detailed Oil and Gas Field Maps” 
(accessed October 2, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/VKt4, and from the U.S. Geological Survey, “Federal Lands of the United States” 
(accessed October 2, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/vdzT.
Note: Shale energy is oil and natural gas extracted from shale and certain other dense rock formations by means of hydraulic fracturing.
Potential Sources of Shale Energy (       ) and Overlapping Federal Land (       ) 
Current Sources of Shale Energy (       ) and Overlapping Federal Land (       ) 
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In addition, the production of shale energy reduces the 
value of natural gas produced from federal offshore leases. 
That reduction diminishes the royalties (which are based 
on sales value) paid by the developers of those resources, 
and it therefore also diminishes the net effects of shale 
development on federal receipts.
On the basis of the preceding estimates and CBO’s cur-
rent forecast of oil and gas prices, along with EIA’s projec-
tions of domestic production, CBO estimates that net 
federal royalties from tight oil and shale gas will total 
about $300 million a year by 2024. CBO anticipates that 
most of those royalties will come from the production of 
tight oil in the southeastern corner of New Mexico and in 
the Rocky Mountain region.48 As with other estimates 
in this report, the $300 million figure is subject to sub-
stantial uncertainty.49
48. Total royalties from those regions will be higher because of the 
production of tight gas, which is not addressed in this report.
49. Various proposals have been made over the years for the federal 
government to increase the royalties that it receives by expanding 
access to energy resources on federally owned land. For more 
information, see Congressional Budget Office, Potential Budgetary 
Effects of Immediately Opening Most Federal Lands to Oil and Gas 
Leasing (August 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43527.
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Effects on the Environment
Various observers are concerned that the develop-
ment of shale resources may reduce the availability of 
water for other uses or contaminate it. They also have 
concerns, as well as hopes, about the effects of shale pro-
duction on greenhouse gas emissions. The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) has not attempted to predict the 
future environmental consequences of shale develop-
ment: The data about those consequences so far are not 
comprehensive enough, future consequences could differ 
from past ones because of the increasing scale of shale 
development, and future technological and regulatory 
developments are unclear. Instead, this appendix dis-
cusses the environmental effects of shale development on 
the basis of research and experience to date.1 It also exam-
ines whether the federal government or state or local gov-
ernments would be more likely to make economically 
efficient decisions about managing those effects.
Water Availability
Because hydraulic fracturing typically requires large 
quantities of water, shale development can contribute to 
strains on freshwater supplies. To date, conflicts between 
shale development and other uses of water have not been 
widespread, but some local ones have occurred.2 In April 
and July of 2012, for example, after the flow volumes 
of local streams dropped below predetermined levels 
because of below-normal precipitation, the Susquehanna 
River Basin Commission temporarily suspended some 
arrangements for water withdrawals, most of which were 
related to shale development. Such conflicts may inten-
sify as shale development increases. One study estimates 
that freshwater withdrawals by the oil and gas industry in 
Texas’s Haynesville-Bossier Shale will reach more than 
3 billion gallons annually between 2020 and 2035—
which is more than double the 2010 amount and corre-
sponds to about 6 percent of total current water use in 
the area.3
Shale developers can reduce the amount of freshwater 
that they require by reusing it. However, the potential for 
reusing water at a particular site depends on how much 
flows back from the well, the cost of treating it so that 
it can be reused, and the freshwater sources and disposal 
options available in the area. For example, in the 
Marcellus Shale, where underground disposal wells for 
used water are scarce, some operations reuse nearly all of 
the water that flows back from their wells—but doing so 
reduces their freshwater needs by 30 percent at most, 
because much of the water that is pumped into the 
1. The environmental effects discussed here are those that are associ-
ated particularly with shale development; effects that involve oil or 
gas more generally, such as leaks from pipelines, are not discussed. 
Concerns about local air pollution are also not discussed, because 
potential policies to address those concerns are similar to potential 
policies to address greenhouse gas emissions, which are discussed 
below.
2. Agriculture and thermoelectric power generation each account for 
about 40 percent of freshwater withdrawals nationwide; the rest is 
used by residences, businesses, and industry (including shale 
development). See Molly A. Maupin and others, Estimated Use of 
Water in the United States in 2010, Circular 1405 (U.S. Geological 
Survey, November 2014), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1405/.
3. Texas Water Development Board, “Historical Water Use 
Estimates,” county table for 2010 (accessed January 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/KftG; Jean-Philippe Nicot and others, Oil 
and Gas Water Use in Texas: Update to the 2011 Mining Water Use 
Report (prepared by the Bureau of Economic Geology, University 
of Texas at Austin, for the Texas Oil and Gas Association, 
September 2012), http://go.usa.gov/KfzC (PDF, 3 MB); and 
Jean-Philippe Nicot, Bureau of Economic Geology, University of 
Texas at Austin, personal communication (January 8, 2014).
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ground remains there.4 Replacing freshwater in hydraulic 
fracturing with treated, nonpotable water or hydro-
carbon-based fluids could also reduce demands on fresh-
water resources, but it is too soon to know whether such 
technological developments will prove widely effective 
and cost-competitive.
In general, rights to use freshwater are controlled by states 
and are more limited than typical property rights, so 
water is not bought and sold in a free market.5 For 
example, some state laws prevent those whose use returns 
water to the local environment from selling their water 
rights to those whose use does not do so. During water 
shortages, other state laws may subject all holders of 
water rights to proportional reductions in use; alterna-
tively, more recent holders may be required to reduce 
their use so that those who preceded them in obtaining 
rights to the same source of water can claim their full 
allocation. Because of such limitations, the amount of 
water that shale operations use may be smaller than the 
amount that would maximize the benefit of such water 
use to society. On the other hand, shale operations may 
have access to more water than the most socially benefi-
cial amount if their impact on the environment is not 
appropriately regulated or reflected in market prices (say, 
by charges that cover wastewater treatment costs and 
other environmental impacts).
Water Quality
Concerns about the effect of shale development on water 
quality involve various sources of potential contamina-
tion: sediment from the construction of drilling plat-
forms; drilling fluids; various chemicals, which constitute 
up to 2 percent of the fracturing fluid injected into a well; 
the liquid removed from a well, which can include not 
only the fracturing fluid but also material from the shale 
formation (such as saltwater, organic compounds, heavy 
metals, and radioactive substances); and the extracted 
shale resources themselves.
Some of those contaminants might affect surface water, 
some might affect groundwater, and some might affect 
both (see Table A-1). However, certain routes of potential 
contamination—inadequate cleaning of the liquid 
removed from a fractured well before wastewater treat-
ment facilities discharge it to surface water, for example, 
or underground migration from disposal wells to ground-
water—are less likely than others, in part because they are 
regulated under the federal Clean Water Act of 1972 
(CWA) or the federal Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 
(SDWA). In some cases, routes of potential contamina-
tion not currently regulated by the federal government 
could be addressed by regulations promulgated under 
state and local laws, especially those governing oil and gas 
production; in other cases, they already are, with varying 
degrees of stringency.6
Other provisions of the SDWA focus not on blocking 
contamination routes but on setting maximum concen-
trations of certain contaminants in water distributed by 
public drinking-water systems. Those provisions do not 
currently cover any of the 59 fracturing-fluid additives 
that companies have disclosed using routinely; however, 
limits for three of them—acetaldehyde, ethylene glycol, 
and methanol—are under consideration by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA).7 The SDWA concen-
tration limits do not apply to private wells of drinking 
water, which serve about 15 percent of the U.S. 
population.
4. See Brian D. Lutz, Aurana N. Lewis, and Martin W. Doyle, 
“Generation, Transport, and Disposal of Wastewater Associated 
With Marcellus Shale Gas Development,” Water Resources 
Research, vol. 49, no. 2 (February 2013), pp. 647–656, http://
tinyurl.com/o9moyxc; and Matthew E. Mantell, “Deep Shale 
Natural Gas and Water Use, Part Two: Abundant, Affordable, and 
Still Water Efficient” (paper presented at the 2010 Ground Water 
Protection Council Annual Forum, Pittsburgh, Pa., September 
27–29, 2010), p. 9, http://tinyurl.com/qxk2djc (PDF, 877 KB).
5. The federal government does have some influence on water alloca-
tions. See Congressional Budget Office, How Federal Policies Affect 
the Allocation of Water (August 2006), www.cbo.gov/publication/
18035.
6. See Nathan Richardson and others, The State of State Shale 
Gas Regulation (Resources for the Future, June 2013), 
http://tinyurl.com/kwbt7l4 (PDF, 5 MB).
7. FracFocus, “What Chemicals Are Used” (accessed December 4, 
2014), http://tinyurl.com/44m94y2; Environmental Protection 
Agency, “Drinking Water Contaminants” (accessed December 4, 
2014), http://water.epa.gov/drink/contaminants/index.cfm; and 
Environmental Protection Agency, “Contaminant Candidate 
List 3” (accessed December 4, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/KG3m. 
The existing limits do cover four chemicals (benzene, ethyl-
benzene, toluene, and xylene) that are less commonly present in 
fracturing fluid but that may be present in fracturing fluid con-
taining diesel, which is used at perhaps 2 percent of wells; see 
Mike Soraghan, “Hydraulic Fracturing: Diesel Still Used to ‘Frack’ 
Wells, FracFocus Data Show,” EnergyWire (August 17, 2012), 
http://tinyurl.com/puduv5m.
APPENDIX A THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF PRODUCING OIL AND NATURAL GAS FROM SHALE 25
CBO
Of course, regulations may not be effective in meeting 
their stated goals, or they may meet their goals but at 
excessive cost. Thus, an important question to ask about 
the regulations related to shale development is whether 
they have positive net benefits—that is, benefits (which 
depend partly on the extent of compliance) minus costs 
(which include enforcement costs). A second important 
question is whether those net benefits could be increased 
by making the regulations more or less stringent. A third 
is whether the regulations reflect adequate scientific 
understanding of the risks associated with the larger-scale 
shale development anticipated for the future. At the 
request of the Congress, the EPA is writing a report on 
the potential effects of hydraulic fracturing on resources 
of drinking water; it should provide information relevant 
to those questions.8
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Some observers are hopeful that shale development will 
result in lower overall greenhouse gas emissions because 
burning natural gas releases less carbon dioxide, a green-
house gas, than burning other fossil fuels does. Specifi-
cally, when measured per unit of energy output, carbon 
dioxide emissions from natural gas combustion are about 
45 percent lower than from coal combustion and about 
30 percent lower than from oil combustion.9 However, 
the effect on greenhouse gas emissions of replacing coal 
or oil with shale gas depends not simply on the fuels’ dif-
ferent emissions during combustion but also on their 
different emissions during extraction, transport, process-
ing, and distribution.10 Moreover, shale gas that does not 
displace coal or oil almost certainly increases total emis-
sions unless technology is used to control the emissions. 
And emissions from all fossil fuels may increase as shale 
development raises gross domestic product and increases 
the demand for energy.
Natural gas can more easily substitute for coal than for 
oil, because both gas and coal are commonly used to gen-
erate electricity. In fact, gas has been replacing coal in 
electricity generation for decades; that trend is expected 
to continue, partly because of the lower gas prices result-
ing from shale development. In contrast, there is little 
current potential for natural gas to replace oil, whether as 
transportation fuel or for heating: Few vehicles run on 
natural gas, and only about 10 percent of heating is 
fueled by oil (some of which, moreover, occurs in areas 
where gas lines do not exist).11
The effects on greenhouse gas emissions of substituting 
shale gas for coal are difficult to estimate. A key factor is 
emissions of methane, the primary component of natural 
gas, during the initial phases of shale gas extraction. 
Methane is a more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon 
dioxide; the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change estimates that methane’s impact on 
the climate, per unit of mass, is 84 times greater than car-
bon dioxide’s over a period of 20 years and 28 times 
greater over 100 years.12 The quantity of methane emis-
sions depends critically on how producers handle the gas 
that emerges as the fracturing fluid injected into a well 
returns to the surface before the main extraction of shale 
energy. They might release it into the atmosphere; burn it 
off to reduce its climate impact, a process called flaring; 
or capture it with “green completion” technologies, which 
reduce total emissions by 90 to 95 percent and are the 
most effective way to minimize their impact on the 
8. When the report is published, it will be available at 
www2.epa.gov/hfstudy.
9. Energy Information Administration, “Voluntary Reporting of 
Greenhouse Gases Program Fuel Emission Coefficients” (January 
31, 2011), Table 1, www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/coefficients.html.
10. For an overview of the measurement of emissions from natural gas 
systems, see A. R. Brandt and others, “Methane Leaks From 
North American Natural Gas Systems,” Science, vol. 343, 
no. 6172 (February 14, 2014), pp. 733–735, http://tinyurl.com/
lfbaay6.
11. Congressional Budget Office, Energy Security in the United States 
(May 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43012.
12. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 
2014: Synthesis Report (IPCC, 2014), p. 100, Box 3.2, Table 1, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/. The impact of methane in the 
short term is of concern because near-term global warming may 
trigger a rapid, nonlinear shift from one climate state to another 
without the possibility of reversal; for example, see Dave Levitan, 
“Quick-Change Planet: Do Global Climate Tipping Points 
Exist?” Scientific American (March 25, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/
kbf247y.
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Table A-1. 
Possible Routes of Water Contamination by Shale Development
Continued
Contamination Route Applicable Federal or State Regulation Additional Information
Surface Water
Sediment transported by storm 
water
Such contamination is regulated by CWA, but 
only if it violates a water quality standard; it 
is also regulated by some states.a
Spills, overflows, and seepage 
from storage pits and tanks
CWA requires oil and gas producers to have 
plans to prevent and contain certain spills; in 
some cases, it requires discharge permits 
and pollution prevention plans.b
Some spills have occurred because of 
equipment failures that developers, viewing 
them as unlikely, had not addressed in their 
prevention plans.
Inadequate cleaning of flowback 
water—which consists of 
fracturing fluid and fluid from the 
rock formation that surface after 
hydraulic fracturing—by 
wastewater treatment facilities
Commercial and industrial sources of 
wastewater that would pose problems for 
wastewater treatment facilities are required 
by general standards in CWA regulations to 
pretreat their wastewater. Specific CWA 
standards for the pretreatment of flowback 
water from shale gas wells are expected to 
be proposed.c Some states also regulate the 
discharge of flowback water to wastewater 
treatment facilities.
Shale operations may not fully comply with 
pretreatment requirements. For example, 
CWA violations in the Allegheny River 
watershed between 2007 and 2011 were 
associated with wastewater from the 
Marcellus Shale processed at three 
Pennsylvania wastewater treatment plants 
between 2007 and 2011. Since mid-2011, 
because of a combination of state prohibitions 
and voluntary actions, shale operators have 
generally not sent flowback to Pennsylvania 
wastewater facilities that cannot provide 
pretreatment. Outside the Marcellus Shale 
area, underground disposal wells are more 
widely available, and developers therefore 
have less economic incentive to dispose of 
flowback water through wastewater 
treatment plants.
Groundwater
Spills CWA regulations designed to protect surface 
water may also protect groundwater.d
Underground migration from rock 
formations targeted by 
developers
SDWA regulations apply to hydraulic 
fracturing only in the cases (about 2 percent 
of the total) in which the fracturing fluid 
includes diesel.e
Typically, the target formation is separated 
from sources of groundwater used for 
consumption by thousands of feet of rock.f 
Some exceptions may exist: A preliminary 
Environmental Protection Agency report found 
that some hydraulic fracturing operations in 
Wyoming that occurred less than 500 feet 
below depths reached by drinking-water wells 
may have contaminated deeper portions of the 
groundwater aquifer that the wells drew 
from.g
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Table A-1. Continued
Possible Routes of Water Contamination by Shale Development
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: CWA = Clean Water Act; SDWA = Safe Drinking Water Act.
a. Sec. 303 of the Clean Water Act of 1972, Public Law 92-500 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1313 (2012)).
b. Sections 301, 311, 402, and 404 of the Clean Water Act, P.L. 92-500 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§1311, 1321, 1342, and 1344 (2012)); 
40 C.F.R. §117 (2013).
c. Clean Water Act; 40 C.F.R. §437 (2013); and Notice of Final 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program Plan, 76 Fed. Reg. 66302 
(October 26, 2011).
d. Sec. 340 of the Clean Water Act, P.L. 92-500 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1314 (2012)).
e. Sec. 1421 of the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, P.L. 93-523 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300h(d) (2012)); and Mike Soraghan, “Hydraulic 
Fracturing: Diesel Still Used to ‘Frack’ Wells, FracFocus Data Show,” EnergyWire (August 17, 2012), http://tinyurl.com/puduv5m.
f. See George E. King, “Hydraulic Fracturing 101” (paper presented at the Society of Petroleum Engineers Hydraulic Fracturing Technology 
Conference, The Woodlands, Texas, February 6–8, 2012), http://tinyurl.com/nt3r3w7 (PDF, 7 MB); Stephen G. Osborn and others, 
“Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, vol. 108, no. 20 (May 17, 2011), pp. 8172–8176, http://tinyurl.com/5w227nj; and Nathaniel R. Warner and others, 
“Geochemical Evidence for Possible Natural Migration of Marcellus Formation Brine to Shallow Aquifers in Pennsylvania,” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 109, no. 30 (July 24, 2012), pp. 11961–11966, http://tinyurl.com/ckfheor.
g. Dominic C. DiGiulio and others, Investigation of Ground Water Contamination Near Pavillion, Wyoming, EPA 600/R-00-000 (draft, 
Environmental Protection Agency, December 2011), http://go.usa.gov/KGNG (PDF, 15 MB). “Less than 500 feet” is a CBO conversion 
from metric data on page xi of the report.
h. Thomas H. Darrah and others, “Noble Gases Identify the Mechanisms of Fugitive Gas Contamination in Drinking-Water Wells Overlying 
the Marcellus and Barnett Shales,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 111, no. 39 (September 13, 2014), pp. 14076–
14081, www.pnas.org/content/111/39/14076.
i. Safe Drinking Water Act; 40 C.F.R. §144.31 (2013).
Contamination Route Applicable Federal or State Regulation Additional Information
Groundwater (Continued)
Underground migration from 
leaking wells
The federal government does not regulate 
well integrity; some states do.
Methane contamination of some drinking-
water wells in Pennsylvania and Texas has 
been linked to leakage from hydraulically 
fractured shale gas wells.h Also, in 2011, 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental 
Protection fined a shale gas developer for 
contaminating well water. Water may contain 
methane for reasons unrelated to hydraulic 
fracturing, so it can be difficult to assign 
responsibility unless water samples were 
taken before shale development began.
Underground migration from 
disposal wells
Disposal wells require an SDWA permit.i SDWA permits are issued after the 
government has determined that the rock 
formation where a disposal well will be 
located is sufficiently isolated from 
groundwater.
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climate.13 The relative use of those three options is not 
well documented, and estimates vary widely.14 In October 
2012, the federal government began requiring shale gas 
developers either to use green completions or to flare 
their emissions.15 By January 2015, green completions 
will be required for new hydraulic fracturing at gas wells, 
although a few categories of wells, such as those used to 
look for gas rather than to extract it, will still be allowed 
to flare.16 There are no such requirements for oil wells.
Because of differences in production methods, shale gas 
that substitutes not for coal or oil but for gas from other 
sources increases total emissions of greenhouse gases 
when emission controls are not in place during the drill-
ing and extraction phases.17 Subsequent production activ-
ities, such as transport, processing, and distribution, may 
be even more significant sources of methane emissions, 
but they are essentially the same for shale gas and conven-
tional gas.18
A given volume of shale gas increases greenhouse gas 
emissions even more when it substitutes for energy 
sources other than fossil fuels—such as nuclear plants, 
windmills, and solar panels—because those energy 
sources emit no greenhouse gases at all in use. (A compre-
hensive comparison of those energy sources with shale gas 
would include the emissions associated with the construc-
tion of facilities, energy production, processing, and 
transport.) Similarly, when shale gas does not displace 
other energy sources but simply increases total energy 
use, all of the emissions resulting from its production, 
distribution, and use are net additions. All things being 
equal, such an increase in energy use would be the likely 
result of lower prices for natural gas and other forms of 
energy. For instance, families might choose to keep their 
homes warmer in the winter because the cost was lower; 
for the same reason, firms might reduce their investments 
in energy-efficient technologies. Also, the faster economic 
growth spurred by cheaper energy would increase 
demand for energy in general, including fossil fuels.
Environmental Policy in a 
Federal System of Government
There are a number of ways in which the government 
may influence the environmental effects of shale develop-
ment: choosing standards for water use, water quality, 
and greenhouse gas emissions; deciding on the acceptable 
methods of meeting those standards; and funding related 
research. Federal policymakers may wish to consider 
whether the current division of regulatory responsibilities 
among federal, state, and local governments is likely 
to lead to decisions that maximize the net benefits to 
society.19
13. Environmental Protection Agency, “Summary of Requirements 
for Processes and Equipment at Natural Gas Well Sites” (accessed 
December 4, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/KGYe (PDF, 412 KB), and 
Proposed New Source Performance Standards and Amendments to the 
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
the Oil and Natural Gas Industry (July 2011), pp. 3–6, 
http://go.usa.gov/KGgH (PDF, 2 MB).
14. For instance, one 2012 assessment assumed that on a national 
basis, 70 percent of the methane emissions associated with extrac-
tion were captured, 15 percent were flared, and 15 percent were 
released into the atmosphere. The Environmental Protection 
Agency, by contrast, assumed that half of those emissions were 
flared and half released. See Francis O’Sullivan and Sergey Paltsev, 
“Shale Gas Production: Potential Versus Actual Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions,” Environmental Research Letters, vol. 7, no. 4 (Novem-
ber 26, 2012), http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/4/044030/; 
and Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Green-
house Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2011, 430-R-13-001 (April 
2013), pp. 3-61 and 3-62, http://go.usa.gov/KGTT (12 MB).
15. The requirements, issued under the authority of the Clean Air 
Act, targeted emissions not of greenhouse gases but of volatile 
organic compounds and toxic air pollutants.
16. A recent study of the methane emissions from 27 hydraulically 
fractured wells of companies that voluntarily participated in the 
study found that two-thirds of the wells—generally, those with the 
largest potential methane emissions—captured or controlled 
methane produced during the initial phases of extraction, proba-
bly in part because of the new and emerging regulatory require-
ments. The remaining one-third released methane into the 
atmosphere, but those wells had much lower emissions potential, 
on average. See David T. Allen and others, “Measurements of 
Methane Emissions at Natural Gas Production Sites in the United 
States,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 110, 
no. 44 (October 29, 2013), pp.17768–17773, www.pnas.org/
content/early/2013/09/10/1304880110.
17. National Energy Technology Laboratory, Environmental Impacts of 
Unconventional Natural Gas Development and Production, DOE/
NETL-2014/1651 (May 2014), pp. 39–56, http://go.usa.gov/
vvXh (PDF, 3.1 MB).
18. See Francis O’Sullivan and Sergey Paltsev, “Shale Gas Production: 
Potential Versus Actual Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Environmen-
tal Research Letters, vol. 7, no. 4 (November 26, 2012), 
http://tinyurl.com/l2r8tcn.
19. For more on environmental policy in a federal system of 
government, see Congressional Budget Office, Federalism and 
Environmental Protection: Case Studies for Drinking Water and 
Ground-Level Ozone (November 1997), www.cbo.gov/
publication/10546.
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Standards
There is a stronger rationale for states and localities to set 
environmental standards for shale development if the 
costs and benefits of controlling the environmental effects 
of such development occur solely within their borders. 
The effects of shale development on the availability of 
water for other uses may be limited to a local area (which 
would not necessarily be a single local jurisdiction), or 
they may extend to a broader region—for instance, by 
affecting groundwater levels in regional aquifers. Simi-
larly, the effects of shale development on water quality 
may be confined to a local area or extend beyond state 
boundaries. Rising or falling greenhouse gas emissions 
have global effects.
Other considerations include which level of government 
has the most information about underlying costs and 
benefits; whether centralizing the process of setting stan-
dards would yield savings in administrative costs; and the 
objectives and capabilities of different levels of govern-
ment. For example, federal policymakers might choose 
standards that gave greater weight to environmental costs 
than state standards would, because states’ objectives 
include competing with each other for industries and 
jobs.
Methods of Meeting Those Standards
There is a stronger rationale for a state or local role, rather 
than a federal one, in deciding which methods may be 
used to meet environmental standards if the opportuni-
ties and costs of available methods vary among areas. For 
example, the cost of addressing water quality concerns 
associated with hydraulic fracturing can vary by locality, 
depending in part on whether local geology allows pro-
ducers to dispose of wastewater in underground disposal 
wells; a federal decision to require that method of dis-
posal might therefore be overly costly in some areas.
Another consideration is whether a particular method of 
meeting environmental standards would be more cost-
effective if it was put to use on a large scale; if so, the 
argument for federal regulation is stronger. That argu-
ment is also stronger when a method of meeting environ-
mental standards would have effects outside the state in 
which it was used. And constraints on states’ willingness 
and ability to select efficient methods of meeting stan-
dards would likewise argue for federal regulation, just as 
such constraints on local governments would argue for 
state regulation.
Research
If many states face the same type of environmental prob-
lem, a stronger rationale exists for the federal government 
to determine and fund a research agenda related to that 
problem. An example is research to determine precisely 
how much methane is emitted by the development of 
shale gas, because such research would help inform poli-
cies on greenhouse gas emissions in many states and at 
the federal level. If the endeavor was left to the states, 
some studies that would be worthwhile to the nation as a 
whole might not be undertaken, because they would not 
be justified by the benefits to a single state or even a small 
group of them. Further, research conducted by one state 
might be duplicated by another if the states failed to 
coordinate plans or share findings.

A PP E N D IX
CBO
B
The Basis of CBO’s Estimates of 
Longer-Term Effects on Economic Output
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 
that real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic product 
(GDP) will be 0.7 percent higher in 2020 and 0.9 per-
cent higher in 2040 than it would have been without the 
development of shale resources. The analysis underlying 
those estimates involved two main steps:
 CBO compared a recent energy market projection 
by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 
which shale resources were available in the United 
States to an alternative projection by CBO in which 
those resources were not available. CBO estimated 
energy prices and quantities for that alternative 
projection by extrapolating from EIA’s estimates of 
the effects on energy markets of differences in future 
amounts of shale energy production.
 Using the two sets of projections, CBO estimated the 
impact that different quantities and prices in energy 
markets would have on GDP, focusing on increases 
in the productivity of existing labor and capital and 
increases in the amount of labor and capital in use.
Oil and Natural Gas Markets With and 
Without Shale Resources
CBO analyzed the domestic consumption and net 
exports of oil products (defined here to include fuels 
derived from petroleum as well as other liquid fuels, such 
as ethanol, biodiesel, and natural gas plant liquids) and of 
natural gas in the projections with and without shale 
resources, as well as the market prices of oil and natural 
gas in those two projections. The analysis also took 
account of the profitability of shale development in the 
projection that included shale resources. In addition, 
CBO constructed alternative cases to account for uncer-
tainty about future production levels, energy prices, and 
profitability of shale gas production.
Consumption and Net Exports of Oil and 
Natural Gas With and Without Shale Resources
The absence of shale resources would reduce the overall 
domestic production of oil and natural gas, as well as the 
domestic use and net exports of natural gas and oil prod-
ucts. However, the magnitudes of those effects differ: 
CBO estimates that 60 percent of a reduction in the 
amount of domestic shale gas produced would be 
reflected in lower domestic gas consumption, that 
roughly 5 percent would be met by an increase in the 
production of natural gas not from shale, and that the 
remaining 35 percent would be reflected in lower exports 
or higher imports. In contrast, CBO estimates that only 
10 percent of a reduction in the amount of tight oil pro-
duced would take the form of lower domestic oil con-
sumption, that roughly 20 percent would reflect an 
increase in the domestic production of crude oil from 
other sources, and that about 70 percent would be 
absorbed by greater net imports.1
1. In this appendix, references to tight oil include not only crude oil 
that is extracted from shale by means of hydraulic fracturing but 
also CBO’s estimate of the portion of the production of natural 
gas plant liquids—forms of natural gas that substitute for certain 
petroleum products—that is produced by hydraulic fracturing. 
Increased production of shale gas sometimes causes more natural 
gas plant liquids to be produced, increasing supplies of liquid 
fuels.
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Those values are averages of the values resulting from 
EIA’s estimates of the sensitivities of future consumption 
levels to the availability of shale energy production.2 Dif-
ferences in market size explain the different effects. 
Because overseas transport to and from North America is 
more costly for natural gas than for crude oil, U.S. pro-
duction of shale gas has a comparatively large effect on 
North American gas prices and thus a comparatively large 
effect on U.S. gas consumption. In contrast, U.S. pro-
duction of tight oil has a comparatively small effect on 
world oil prices, so changes in that production have a rel-
atively small effect on domestic oil consumption and are 
primarily reflected in changes in net exports.3
Thus, given EIA’s baseline projection that shale gas pro-
duction will be about 9.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf ) in 
2014, CBO projects that in the absence of that produc-
tion, total domestic gas production would be about 
9.0 Tcf lower (because conventional production would 
increase by about 0.5 Tcf ), domestic consumption would 
be about 5.5 Tcf lower (roughly 60 percent of 9.5 Tcf ), 
and net exports would be about 3.5 Tcf lower (through 
lower exports or higher imports). CBO similarly esti-
mates that the domestic production, consumption, and 
net exports of oil products would all be lower in 2014—
by 3.9 million, 0.5 million, and 3.4 million barrels per 
day, respectively—in the absence of the estimated 
4.8 million barrels per day of liquid fuels attributable to 
shale development.4 CBO’s projections of the production 
and consumption of oil and natural gas with and without 
shale resources are shown in Figure B-1.
Market Prices of Oil and Natural Gas With and 
Without Shale Resources
Given the estimated differences in the domestic con-
sumption of oil products and natural gas with and with-
out shale resources, the differences in market prices 
supporting those consumption levels can be calculated by 
using the elasticity of demand for those fuels. Elasticities 
measure the percentage change in the production or the 
consumption of a good for each 1 percent change in the 
price. Given the estimated reduction in consumption 
when shale resources are not available (measured relative 
to the baseline projection, in which they are available), 
the percentage difference in market prices ( ) is 
given by the following equation:
In that equation, refers to the percentage differ-
ence in the consumption of oil products or natural gas, 
and is the elasticity of demand with respect to differ-
ences in the market price of oil or gas.
On the basis of EIA’s most recent long-term outlook, 
CBO estimates the long-term elasticities of demand for 
oil products and for natural gas to be about -0.5 each, so 
that a 20 percent increase in the price of oil products or 
natural gas would reduce the amount of oil and gas con-
sumed by 0.5 times as much, or 10 percent. For instance, 
domestic gas consumption in 2040 would be about 
11.5 Tcf lower in the absence of shale supplies, CBO esti-
mates; that 11.5 Tcf is about 35 percent of 2040 domes-
tic consumption in the baseline projection, implying that 
gas prices (given the elasticity of demand) would be about 
70 percent higher without shale supplies, as Figure B-2 
shows. Again, U.S. production of tight oil will have a 
smaller effect on world prices, which would be about 
5 percent higher otherwise, because U.S. tight oil as a 
share of world liquid fuel supplies is much smaller than 
U.S. shale gas as a share of North American gas supplies.
2. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB). The estimates are based 
on changes in the consumption of gas or of total liquid fuels rela-
tive to changes in the production of shale gas or tight oil between 
EIA’s “low-resource scenario” and its baseline case. CBO’s estimate 
reflects the five-year average of those ratios from 2036 to 2040 to 
control for any year-to-year variability and to reflect longer-term 
conditions stemming from the historical absence of shale resources 
(rather than the near-term effects that would result from a sudden 
increase or decrease in the availability of shale resources).
3. Although sensitivities at a moment in time are not directly compa-
rable with changes that occur over time, CBO’s estimated effects 
are qualitatively consistent with the fact that observed consump-
tion levels have not grown as fast as shale energy production, in 
part because of decreases in conventional production. For 
instance, from 2001 to 2013, U.S. shale gas production increased 
by 9 trillion cubic feet (Tcf ) per year, conventional gas production 
fell by 4.5 Tcf, and gas consumption increased by 3.5 Tcf. See 
Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
With Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
4. The estimate of 4.8 million barrels per day in 2014 consists of 
EIA’s projected tight oil production—about 4.1 million barrels 
per day—and 0.7 million of the 2.5 million barrels per day that 
EIA projects for natural gas plant liquids. The remaining 1.8 mil-
lion barrels per day of natural gas plant liquids correspond to the 
average production of those liquids from 2006 to 2009, just 
before the boom in shale gas and tight oil production. See EIA’s 
Annual Energy Outlook for 2014 and for 2006 through 2009.
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Figure B-1.
Effects of Shale Resources on the Domestic Production and Consumption of 
Natural Gas and Liquid Fuels
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With Projections to 2040, 
DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
Notes: Production and consumption amounts for natural gas and liquid fuels when shale resources are present (labeled “With Shale 
Resources”) are the Energy Information Administration’s most recent long-term projections. Projections when shale resources are not 
present (labeled “Without Shale Resources”) are CBO’s estimates.
The category “Liquid Fuel” includes crude oil, biofuels, natural gas plant liquids, and other liquid fuels.
The projections for all years are based on the assumptions that the economy is producing close to its maximum sustainable level of 
output and that energy markets are stable. As the text explains, CBO expects that the actual effects would be somewhat different in 
the short term.
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Figure B-2.
Effects of Shale Resources on the Price of 
Natural Gas and Liquid Fuels
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Energy Information 
Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With 
Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
Notes: Market prices for natural gas and liquid fuels when shale 
resources are present (labeled “With Shale Resources”) are 
the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s) most recent 
long-term projections. Projections when shale resources are 
not present (labeled “Without Shale Resources”) are CBO’s 
estimates. CBO reports prices in 2012 dollars because that 
was the basis that EIA used when modeling its projections in 
real (inflation-adjusted) terms.
The category “Liquid Fuels” includes crude oil, biofuels, 
natural gas plant liquids, and other liquid fuels.
The projections for all years are based on the assumptions 
that the economy is producing close to its maximum sus-
tainable level of output and that energy markets are stable. 
As the text explains, CBO expects that the actual effects 
would be somewhat different in the short term.
Combining those estimated price effects with estimates 
of production volumes, CBO calculates that the value of 
U.S. oil and gas production in 2020 in the absence of 
shale development would be about $495 billion (mea-
sured in 2012 dollars), as opposed to $645 billion with 
shale development.5 In 2040, the value of U.S. oil and gas 
production would be roughly $760 billion without shale 
development, as opposed to $950 billion with it. 
Profitability of Shale Development
Excess returns from producing shale resources—that is, 
revenues less production costs—contribute to GDP. They 
represent the difference between the output of labor and 
capital when used to produce shale resources and the out-
put of that labor and capital when used elsewhere in the 
economy.6 Those excess returns are determined by the 
volume of tight oil and shale gas expected to be produced 
in future years and the difference between the market 
prices of oil and natural gas and the average break-even 
cost of producing shale resources—that is, the lowest 
average price necessary for developers of shale resources to 
cover their costs of labor and capital.
CBO’s estimates of the current and future break-even 
costs of tight oil and shale gas production are based on 
recent estimates from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA).7 IEA estimates that current production costs of 
tight oil worldwide range from $60 to $100 per barrel 
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5. In CBO’s baseline projection, in which shale resources are 
assumed to be available, 29.1 Tcf of gas are expected to be pro-
duced in the United States during 2020 at a price of $4.40 per 
million British thermal units (mmBtu). Because there are roughly 
1.03 mmBtu in each thousand cubic feet (mcf ) of gas and 1 Tcf 
equals 1 billion mcf, sales of natural gas will total about $130 bil-
lion (29.1 multiplied by 1.03 multiplied by $4.40 multiplied by 
1 billion). With total liquid fuel production expected to be 
14.5 million barrels per day and an oil price of $97 per barrel 
(assumed to be the same for nonpetroleum fuels), sales of liquid 
fuels are expected to total about $1.4 billion per day (14.5 million 
multiplied by $97), or $515 billion per year. In the absence of 
shale resources, CBO projects, 2020 gas and oil prices would be 
$6.90 per mmBtu and $103 per barrel; U.S. gas and oil produc-
tion would be 16.7 Tcf and 9.9 million barrels per day; and total 
spending on natural gas and liquid fuels would be about 
$495 billion.
6. The labor and capital used to produce shale energy include what is 
used to produce goods and services subsequently employed in 
shale development—for example, the labor and capital used to 
produce the concrete that, in turn, provides the casing of a new 
well.
7. International Energy Agency, Resources to Reserves 2013: Oil, Gas 
and Coal Technologies for the Energy Markets of the Future (IEA, 
2013), www.iea.org/w/bookshop/add.aspx?id=447.
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(in 2013 dollars). CBO estimates that the average break-
even cost of U.S. tight oil is the midpoint of IEA’s range 
of world costs—that is, $80 per barrel. That figure is con-
sistent with the fact that the production of U.S. tight oil 
became significant in the last few years, as world oil prices 
climbed past $100 per barrel. For shale gas, CBO esti-
mates that the current break-even production cost in the 
United States is $3 per million British thermal units 
(mmBtu), at the low end of IEA’s worldwide range of 
$3 to $10 per mmBtu (in 2013 dollars). One reason for 
that estimate is that investment in shale gas in the United 
States has remained robust even as gas prices have fallen 
below $4 per mmBtu. Another reason is that world pro-
duction of shale gas has been concentrated in the United 
States; domestic production costs are probably lower than 
in countries where development is proceeding more 
slowly.
CBO expects that break-even costs will grow in real terms 
as real prices for oil and gas grow. As market prices rise, 
companies will develop shale gas and tight oil that are 
more costly to produce, thereby raising the average cost 
of production. Specifically, CBO models the average 
break-even cost for tight oil as growing at the same rate at 
which real prices for crude oil do, so that the inflation-
adjusted break-even cost grows from $80 per barrel in 
2014 to about $110 per barrel by 2040. For shale gas, 
however, CBO models the inflation-adjusted break-even 
cost as growing at half the rate expected for the real price 
of natural gas, so that the real break-even cost grows from 
$3 per mmBtu in 2014 to about $4 per mmBtu by 2040. 
CBO’s different expectations for shale gas and tight oil 
are broadly consistent with EIA projections that shale gas 
production will grow as a share of total U.S. gas produc-
tion in coming decades because it will become relatively 
cheaper, while tight oil’s share of total U.S. production of 
liquid fuels will not change significantly.
CBO estimates that inflation-adjusted excess returns in 
2020 will total roughly $20 billion for shale gas, an esti-
mate based on about 13 Tcf of production, a price of 
$4.40 per mmBtu, and a break-even cost of $2.90 per 
mmBtu. CBO also estimates—on the basis of about 
5.6 million barrels per day of expected production, a 
price of $97 per barrel, and a break-even cost of $75 per 
barrel—that inflation-adjusted excess returns in 2020 will 
total $45 billion for tight oil. In 2040, CBO expects 
inflation-adjusted excess returns to total about $75 bil-
lion for shale gas and $50 billion for tight oil.
Uncertainty About Projections
Shale energy production, market prices of gas and oil, 
and the profitability of shale gas production may be sig-
nificantly higher or lower than CBO projects in its base-
line. All things being equal, higher production, market 
prices, and profitability would mean larger effects on 
GDP. To illustrate the uncertainty accompanying its base-
line estimates, CBO generated alternative projections of 
those three factors.
CBO constructed a range of shale production quantities 
on the basis of a recent EIA “low-resource” projection in 
which the total amount of gas and oil recoverable from 
each shale gas and tight oil well was 50 percent lower 
than in EIA’s baseline projection.8 Comparing the two 
projections, CBO calculated the percentage difference 
in the number of Btus of shale gas and tight oil produced 
each year. CBO then obtained its range of shale produc-
tion quantities by increasing or decreasing its baseline 
projections for shale gas and tight oil production by those 
year-by-year percentages.9 The resulting percentage devi-
ations from baseline production levels are shown in 
Figure B-3.
To generate alternative projections of market prices, CBO 
relied on EIA’s most recent long-term outlook, which 
includes projections for higher and lower oil prices. 
(CBO used the market price of crude oil to approximate 
the price of liquid fuels, which include crude oil, the 
petroleum products produced from it, and other liquids, 
such as biofuels and natural gas plant liquids.) In the 
absence of analogous EIA projections for natural gas 
prices, CBO used the same percentage increase and 
decrease (relative to the baseline projections) that it did 
for the price of oil. The high and low prices that CBO 
obtained for natural gas and oil are shown in Figure B-4.
8. See the low-resource scenario in Energy Information Administra-
tion, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With Projections to 2040, 
DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), http://go.usa.gov/8KyF 
(PDF, 12 MB). The actual production of shale gas and tight oil in 
that scenario falls by less than 50 percent because the effects of the 
decline take some time to materialize and because higher market 
prices promote the development of additional wells.
9. EIA also analyzed a high-resource scenario in which shale gas and 
tight oil wells were more productive than they were in the agency’s 
baseline projection. CBO did not use that scenario to calculate 
any of its range of shale production quantities because the scenario 
included changes to conventional oil and gas supplies that were 
not included in EIA’s low-resource scenario.
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Figure B-3.
Projected High and Low Production of 
Shale Gas and Tight Oil
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Energy Information 
Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With 
Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
Notes: Here, the production of tight oil includes not only crude oil 
that is extracted from shale by means of hydraulic fracturing 
but also CBO’s estimate of the portion of the production of 
natural gas plant liquids—forms of natural gas that substi-
tute for certain petroleum products—that is produced by 
hydraulic fracturing.
EIA = Energy Information Administration.
To measure the sensitivity of CBO’s findings to the prof-
itability of producing shale gas, CBO considered cases in 
which break-even costs for shale gas grew at 25 percent 
and 75 percent of the yearly change in gas prices, rather 
than the 50 percent assumed in the baseline projection. 
In dollar terms, excess returns from shale gas production 
are greatest if the market price of gas is high and the 
break-even cost of production is low; conversely, excess 
returns are smallest if the market price of gas is low and 
the break-even cost is high.
When evaluating the effects of greater or lesser availability 
of shale energy supplies, CBO included price effects 
resulting from those differences in supplies. For any given 
assumption about other factors affecting prices—whether 
those factors lead to high prices, baseline prices, or low 
prices—more abundant shale energy supplies will, all else 
being equal, reduce those prices. Similarly, those prices 
will be higher if supplies are less abundant. CBO used the 
same approach that was outlined above to calculate the 
effect of more or less shale production on those price sce-
narios: More (or less) abundant shale gas or tight oil 
boosts (or lowers) consumption levels, leading to a per-
centage change in market prices that is calculated by 
means of the elasticity of demand.
Effects of Shale Development on 
Economic Output in the Longer Term
Real GDP will be higher in the longer term than it would 
have been without the development of shale resources. 
CBO estimates that, by increasing the productivity of 
labor and capital, the production and use of shale gas will 
make GDP about 0.2 percent higher in 2020 and about 
0.4 percent higher in 2040 than it would have been 
otherwise, and the production and use of tight oil will 
make GDP about 0.2 percent higher in both of those 
years (see Table B-1). Moreover, because that higher pro-
ductivity of labor and capital will induce a greater supply 
of labor and capital in the economy, shale development 
will further increase GDP by roughly 0.3 percent and 0.4 
percent in 2020 and 2040, respectively. All told, CBO’s 
baseline long-term projection for real GDP is 0.7 percent 
higher in 2020 and 0.9 percent higher in 2040 than it 
would have been without the development of shale 
resources.10
CBO’s analysis focused on the effects on GDP in the lon-
ger term—that is, after the economy moves back toward 
producing its maximum sustainable level of output. In 
the near term, the increase in GDP associated with
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10. Because of rounding, the total change in real GDP is slightly less 
than the sum of the component changes.
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Figure B-4.
Projected High and Low Market Prices of 
Natural Gas and Oil
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Energy Information 
Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014 With 
Projections to 2040, DOE/EIA-0383(2014) (April 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/8KyF (PDF, 12 MB).
Notes: CBO reports prices in 2012 dollars because that was the 
basis that EIA used when modeling its projections in real 
(inflation-adjusted) terms.
EIA = Energy Information Administration.
increased production and use of shale resources is greater 
because the firms producing and using more shale 
resources use some labor and capital that would otherwise 
have been underused. For example, in the current eco-
nomic environment, some of the workers employed by 
businesses engaged in hydraulic fracturing would other-
wise have been unemployed. In the economic environ-
ment that CBO expects in the long run, however, such 
workers would otherwise have been employed in other 
jobs.
Effects of Shale Gas on the Productivity of 
Labor and Capital
To think about the long-term effects of shale gas on pro-
ductivity and hence on GDP, consider Figure B-5 on 
page 39, which shows two hypothetical supply curves for 
natural gas: one that does not include shale gas and one 
that does. The supply curve without shale gas is line S1, 
and it intersects the demand curve for natural gas—line 
D—at point A, showing that without shale gas, the mar-
ket for natural gas would clear (that is, demand would 
equal supply) at a price of $4 per thousand cubic feet 
(mcf ).11 Once shale gas becomes available, the total sup-
ply of natural gas shifts to S2, meaning that more gas is 
available at a lower price. The horizontal difference 
between S1 and S2 is the amount of shale gas supplied at 
a given price. For example, at a price of $3 per mcf, the 
supply of shale gas is the horizontal difference between 
the quantities represented by points E and B. The market 
now clears at point B, at a price of $3.
The gain in GDP in the long run from that outward shift 
of the supply curve closely corresponds to the area 
enclosed by points A, B, and C. The gain is composed of 
three parts:
 The gain from the increased productivity of labor and 
capital used to produce shale gas, which corresponds 
to the area enclosed by points B, C, and E;
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11. The market that determines the domestic price of natural gas 
includes supply and demand in Canada and Mexico. To focus on 
the effects on GDP in the United States, the reader should inter-
pret the supply curves, S1 and S2, as representing domestic sup-
ply, and the demand curve, D, as representing demand net of 
supplies from Canada and Mexico.
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Table B-1. 
Effects of U.S. Shale Development on GDP
Percent
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: Totals may not match because of rounding.
Tight oil is crude oil extracted from shale and certain other dense rock formations by means of hydraulic fracturing.
GDP = gross domestic product; * = between zero and 0.05 percent.
a. These lines add shale gas’s effects on GDP (shown above in the table) to tight oil’s effects on GDP (also shown above in the table).
 The gain in productivity from producing shale gas 
instead of more expensive conventional gas, which 
corresponds to the triangle with corners at points A, E, 
and F; and
 The gain in productivity from the increased consump-
tion of gas by domestic businesses and households, 
which is included in the area enclosed by points A, B, 
and F.12
Gains From the Increased Productivity of Labor and 
Capital Producing Shale Gas. In the longer run, the 
development of shale gas leads to higher GDP in part 
because labor and capital can be used more productively 
to produce shale gas than to produce other output. In 
Figure B-5, that gain is shown by the area between the 
two supply curves and below $3 per mcf—the triangle 
bounded by points B, C, and E. In Figure B-6, the same 
gain is shown by the area above the supply curve S3—
which is a supply curve for shale gas alone—and below 
$3; it is also a triangle bounded by points B, C, and E. 
(The distance from B to E in Figure B-5 represents the 
quantity of shale gas produced at the new equilibrium 
price—the same quantity represented by the distance 
from B to E in Figure B-6. The areas of the two triangles 
bounded by points B, C, and E in the two figures are the 
same because their bases and heights are the same.)
Increased Productivity of Labor and Capital
Shale gas
Gain in productivity of labor and capital producing shale gas 0.1 0.3
Gain in productivity from producing shale gas instead of conventional gas * *
Gain in productivity from increased consumption of gas 0.1 0.1___ ___
Subtotal 0.2 0.4
Tight oil
Gain in productivity of labor and capital producing tight oil 0.2 0.2
Gain in productivity from producing tight oil instead of conventional oil * *
Gain in productivity from increased consumption of oil * *___ ___
Subtotal 0.2 0.2___ ___
Total 0.4 0.5
Additional Supply of Labor and Capital 0.3 0.4
Total Effect of U.S. Shale Development on GDP 0.7 0.9
Memorandum:a
Gains in Productivity of Labor and Capital Producing Shale Resources 0.3 0.4
Gains in Productivity From Producing Shale Resources Instead of Conventional Resources * *
Gains in Productivity From Increased Consumption of Gas and Oil 0.1 0.1
2020 2040
Effect on GDP
12. The area enclosed by points A, B, and F also includes the gain to 
foreign users that are able to consume more natural gas. In calcu-
lating the gains to U.S. GDP, CBO considered only the changes in 
domestic consumption.
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Figure B-5.
Hypothetical Long-Run Market for 
Natural Gas
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: Line D is the hypothetical demand curve for natural gas pro-
duced in the United States. Lines S1 and S2 are the supply 
curves for natural gas without and with shale resources. 
Points A and B denote the price and quantity of natural gas 
produced in the United States in those two cases.
At any point along S3 in Figure B-6, the addition to 
GDP from the production of shale gas is the vertical dis-
tance between the supply curve and the price of gas. For 
example, at point C, a firm is willing to supply shale gas 
at a long-run price of $1 per mcf or more because the cost 
of labor and capital used by that firm to produce 1 mcf of 
gas is $1. That $1 of labor and capital would be produc-
ing $1 of GDP if employed in other industries. At a price 
of $3, the shift of labor and capital from other industries 
generates an extra $2 of GDP, the vertical difference 
between points C and E. To take another example: At 
point B of Figure B-6, the production of an additional 
1 mcf of shale gas is profitable only if the long-run price 
is $3 or more. Because the labor and capital used to pro-
duce that gas could produce $3 of GDP elsewhere, there 
is no net gain in GDP from the production of shale gas 
that is also valued at $3.
Another way to think about the gain in GDP from the 
production of shale gas is to subtract the total cost of 
producing shale gas from the total value of that gas. The 
cost is the quantity of gas produced multiplied by the 
break-even cost, and it is shown by the area enclosed by 
points B, C, J, and K in Figure B-6. The value of the gas 
produced is its price multiplied by the quantity pro-
duced, which is shown by the rectangle whose corners are 
points B, E, J, and K. The difference is represented by the 
triangle enclosed by points B, C, and E.
CBO estimated the long-term gain in GDP from the pro-
duction of shale gas by multiplying its estimate of the 
amount of shale gas produced (which would correspond 
to the distance between points B and E in Figure B-6, 
though that figure, again, is hypothetical) by the differ-
ence between the price of that gas and CBO’s estimate of 
the average break-even cost of that production (which 
would be equivalent to the vertical midpoint of the sup-
ply curve between points B and C). CBO estimates the 
GDP gain from the production of shale gas to be 0.1 per-
cent of GDP in 2020 and 0.3 percent in 2040. In 2012 
dollars, the 2040 estimate is about $75 billion, which is 
based on projections that shale gas production in 2040 
will total about 20 billion mcf; that the market price of 
gas will be about $8 per mcf; and that the average break-
even cost of shale gas will be about $4 per mcf.
Figure B-6.
Hypothetical Long-Run Supply Curve for 
Shale Gas
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: Line S3 is the supply curve for shale gas. Point B denotes the 
quantity of shale gas produced in the United States at a price 
of $3 per thousand cubic feet.
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The gains in GDP from producing shale gas are greater in 
the near term than in the long term. When labor and 
capital are underused, some of the resources used to pro-
duce shale gas would not otherwise be producing GDP. 
In that case, the gain to GDP from producing shale gas is 
represented not only by the triangle enclosed by points B, 
C, and E in Figure B-6 but also by part of the area 
enclosed by points B, C, J, and K.
Gains in Productivity From Producing Shale Gas 
Instead of Conventional Gas. The gain in GDP from sub-
stituting shale gas for conventional gas that is no longer 
economical to produce because of the lower price of gas 
corresponds to the triangle enclosed by points A, E, and F 
in Figure B-5. A firm willing to supply additional con-
ventional gas at point A requires a price of $4 per mcf 
because it uses $4 of labor and capital. Displacing that 
conventional gas with shale gas produced at a cost of $3 
thus frees up $1 of labor and capital for other uses, 
increasing GDP by $1. A firm willing to supply addi-
tional conventional gas at point E uses $3 of labor and 
capital to produce that gas, so replacing it with shale gas 
at $3 per mcf does not add to GDP.
The savings that consumers of natural gas realize because 
of the fall in price from $4 to $3 is represented by 
the rectangle enclosed by points A, F, H, and G in 
Figure B-5. Most of those savings do not add to GDP but 
instead represent a transfer from producers to consumers 
of natural gas. Within that rectangle, only the savings in 
production costs, which are represented by the triangle 
outlined by points A, E, and F, add to GDP.
CBO estimated the gain in GDP from substituting shale 
gas for conventional gas by multiplying the estimated dif-
ference in U.S. production of conventional gas by one-
half the difference between the projected price of gas and 
the estimated price that would prevail in the absence of 
shale resources. The gain in GDP is projected to be very 
small in both 2020 and 2040—less than 0.05 percent of 
GDP—because the production of conventional gas is 
expected to be only about 5 percent lower than it would 
have been without shale resources.
Gains in Productivity From Increased Consumption of 
Gas. The development of shale resources also raises GDP 
as consumption of cheaper gas frees up labor and capital 
for other uses, allowing the economy to produce a greater 
value of goods and services with the same total amount of 
labor and capital. In Figure B-5, those gains are included 
in the triangle enclosed by points A, B, and F. (That tri-
angle also includes gains to foreign firms that use more 
natural gas. Those gains do not contribute to U.S. GDP, 
and CBO excluded them from its calculations.)
As the price of natural gas falls, productivity increases for 
two reasons. First, some firms are able to reduce their cost 
of producing goods and services by substituting cheaper 
gas for labor, capital, or other inputs. For example, an 
electric utility might generate more electricity from gas 
and less from coal. Second, the composition of output 
produced in the economy changes as households and 
firms shift toward goods and services that are gas-
intensive and thus become relatively less costly to 
produce. For example, households might buy more tires, 
fertilizer, and plastic containers, and spend less on 
clothes.
In both cases, the benefit to the economy of each addi-
tional thousand cubic feet of natural gas used is the dif-
ference between the highest price at which that gas would 
be purchased, represented by the heights of the points 
along demand curve D in Figure B-5, and its actual sell-
ing price. Consider, for example, an electric utility willing 
to buy an additional 1 mcf of natural gas at a price up to 
$4—the level of demand represented by point A in the 
figure. That willingness to spend up to $4 reflects the 
utility’s ability to substitute the gas—as well as the costs 
of using it—for other resources that together cost the 
same amount. For instance, the utility might buy 1 mcf 
of gas costing $4, plus $5 of other necessary goods and 
services, to generate electricity that was previously gener-
ated from coal at the same total cost of $9. If, instead, the 
gas costs $3, producing electricity with gas instead of coal 
reduces the utility’s costs by $1 (the distance between 
points A and F), and the $1 of labor and capital that is no 
longer needed to generate electricity can produce an addi-
tional $1 of output elsewhere in the economy.13 Addi-
tional consumption of natural gas by firms whose 
demand is represented by points between A and B on the 
demand curve would free up smaller amounts of labor 
and capital, and GDP would increase by amounts 
13. The utility itself might not reduce its use of labor and capital, but 
those resources would be freed up elsewhere in the economy—
particularly in coal production and related activities. Note that the 
effect on the composition of GDP exceeds the effect on its size: In 
this hypothetical situation, the output of the natural gas industry 
increases by $3 and GDP increases by $1.
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Figure B-7.
Hypothetical Long-Run Market for 
Crude Oil in the United States
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: Line D is the hypothetical demand curve for crude oil 
consumed in the United States. Lines S1 and S2 are the 
domestic supply curves for crude oil without and with shale 
resources. Points A and B denote the price and quantity of 
crude oil consumed in the United States in those two cases. 
Points C and L denote the price and quantity of crude oil 
supplied by U.S. producers in those two cases.
between $1 and zero for each additional 1 mcf of gas 
used.
Similar logic applies in the case of shifts in demand 
toward goods and services that are more gas-intensive. 
For an additional unit of a gas-intensive product, a house-
hold or firm at point A is willing to pay $4 per mcf for 
the natural gas that went into making the product, plus 
the other costs of the product, instead of spending the 
same total amount on other goods or services. If natural 
gas costs $4 per mcf, then such a shift does not increase 
GDP, though it does change GDP’s composition: The 
same total quantity of resources not used to produce the 
goods or services forgone is used to produce the addi-
tional unit of the gas-intensive product. If natural gas 
instead costs $3 per mcf to produce, the buyer’s shift to 
the gas-intensive product reduces the total production 
costs of the goods purchased, and each additional 1 mcf 
used frees up $1 of resources that can produce additional 
GDP.
CBO estimated the gain in GDP by multiplying the esti-
mated change in U.S. consumption of gas by one-half the 
difference between the projected price of gas and the esti-
mated price that would prevail in the absence of shale 
resources. The gain in GDP is projected to be 0.1 percent 
in 2020 and also in 2040.
Effects of Tight Oil on the Productivity of 
Labor and Capital
The effects on GDP of the domestic production of tight 
oil differ from those of the domestic production of shale 
gas because oil is traded in a global market. Thus, most of 
the gains from greater consumption of tight oil will occur 
outside the United States. However, all of the gains from 
using labor and capital more productively to produce 
tight oil than they could be used for other purposes will 
add to U.S. GDP—by 0.2 percent of GDP in 2020 and 
2040, CBO estimates.
Gains From the Increased Productivity of Labor and 
Capital Producing Tight Oil. The gains in GDP associated 
with using labor and capital to produce tight oil instead 
of other goods and services are illustrated in Figure B-7. 
The availability of tight oil shifts the supply curve of all 
U.S. crude oil from S1 to S2. The price of oil, established 
in the world oil market (which is not shown), falls from 
point J to point K. As a result, U.S. consumption of 
crude oil increases along the demand curve from A to B. 
The supply of conventional crude oil produced domesti-
cally falls from H to E, but the total domestic production 
of crude oil increases from H to L. Imports of crude oil 
fall, as the difference between the domestic demand for 
crude oil and the domestic supply narrows from the dis-
tance between A and C to the distance between B and L.
Most of the increase in GDP comes from the fact that 
labor and capital can be used more productively to pro-
duce tight oil than to produce other output. Using the 
same approach that it used when analyzing shale gas pro-
duction, CBO estimated the long-term gains in GDP 
from the production of tight oil by multiplying its esti-
mate of the amount of tight oil produced (which would 
correspond to the distance between points L and E in 
Figure B-7) by the difference between the price of that oil 
(point K) and CBO’s estimate of the average break-even 
cost of that production (which would be equivalent to 
the midpoint of the supply curve between points F and 
L). CBO estimates that the production of tight oil will 
increase GDP by 0.2 percent in 2020 and 2040. In 2012 
dollars, the 2040 figure is about $50 billion, which is 
Production and Consumption
S2
S1
Price
H
E
C
L
J
K
F
D
A
G
B
42 THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF PRODUCING OIL AND NATURAL GAS FROM SHALE DECEMBER 2014
CBO
based on projections of 4.4 million barrels per day (or 
about 1.6 billion barrels per year) of tight oil production 
in 2040; a price of roughly $140 per barrel; and an 
average break-even cost of about $110.
Gains in Productivity From Producing Tight Oil 
Instead of Conventional Oil. The gain in GDP from sub-
stituting tight oil for conventional oil that is no longer 
economical to produce because of the lower price of oil 
corresponds to the triangle bounded by points C, E, and 
H in Figure B-7. CBO estimated that gain in GDP by 
multiplying its estimate of the change in U.S. production 
of conventional oil by one-half the difference between the 
projected price of oil and the hypothetical price in the 
absence of shale resources. The gain is proportionally 
much smaller than the analogous gain for shale gas 
because oil is traded in a global market, which implies 
that the percentage impact of shale development on 
world oil prices is much smaller than the percentage 
impact on U.S. gas prices and thus that the effect on U.S. 
production of conventional oil is also much smaller. As a 
result, the effect on GDP will be very small in both 2020 
and 2040, CBO projects.
Gains in Productivity From Increased Consumption of 
Oil. To a small degree, GDP rises as firms substitute 
cheaper oil for labor and capital and as goods and services 
produced using oil become cheaper to produce than 
other goods and services. The gain to GDP is reflected in 
the triangle bounded by points A, B, and G. Because the 
production of tight oil will have relatively little impact on 
the price of crude oil, CBO estimates that U.S. consump-
tion of crude oil will be essentially unchanged and that 
the effect on GDP will be very small in both 2020 and 
2040. (The majority of the gains from using more crude 
oil will accrue outside the United States.)
Effects of Shale Gas and Tight Oil on the 
Supplies of Labor and Capital
The increases in GDP associated with increased produc-
tivity would spur further increases in GDP by increasing 
the supplies of labor and capital. As GDP rises, house-
holds have more income to save and invest; most of the 
additional savings are invested domestically. That invest-
ment increases the capital stock, thus increasing the econ-
omy’s productive capacity and raising GDP. In addition, 
higher labor productivity is reflected in higher wages, 
which encourage people to work and lead to an increase 
in the number of hours worked, likewise raising GDP. 
The two effects reinforce each other: A larger capital 
stock boosts labor productivity and wages, and an 
increase in the number of hours worked increases saving 
and investment.
CBO estimates that those indirect effects of shale devel-
opment will raise GDP by 0.3 percent in 2020 and by 
0.4 percent in 2040. Those estimates are based on projec-
tions of an increase of 0.1 percent in the number of hours 
worked in both years and of increases in the capital stock 
of 0.7 percent in 2020 and 0.9 percent in 2040. The pro-
jected changes in hours worked are derived from CBO’s 
estimate that the elasticity of labor supply is 0.19 (so that 
a 1 percent increase in GDP per hour worked boosts the 
labor supply by 0.19 percent).14 The changes in the capi-
tal stock are based on the expectation that saving and 
investment rise proportionally with output, so that in the 
long run, the percentage increase in the capital stock is 
equal to the percentage increase in output. CBO con-
verted the changes in hours worked and capital stock into 
a change in GDP on the basis of a coefficient for labor 
in the production function of 0.7 and a coefficient for 
capital of 0.3.
14. Congressional Budget Office, How the Supply of Labor Responds 
to Changes in Fiscal Policy (October 2012), www.cbo.gov/
publication/43674. CBO’s labor supply elasticity is the sum 
of its estimates of the substitution elasticity (how much an 
increase in wages increases the amount of labor supplied 
because working becomes more valuable relative to other uses 
of people’s time) and of the income elasticity (how much an 
increase in wages allows people to work fewer hours while 
maintaining their standard of living).
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